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Trial and Tribulation:
The Story of United States v. Anthony
RAYNE L. HAMMONDt
"What a sham is freedom."
-Iowa resident Alzina Rathburn, deploring the
subjection of women in a professed democracy
in an 1870 letter to Susan B. Anthony'
INTRODUCTION
As the close of the twentieth century creeps relentlessly
closer, America has touted the myriad of sociological, legal,
and technological milestones reached by the nation in the
last hundred years. Historians appear unanimous in
applauding the establishment of universal suffrage, and
illuminating the ways in which women have come to
participate in the legislative and judicial processes since
their enfranchisement. Much of the credit for this
achievement belongs to woman suffragist Susan B.
Anthony, whose capability and charismatic success in
bringing womens' issues to the forefront of the political
arena qualify her as one of the first great women
politicians. Anthony's efforts came at great personal cost;
her quest would dictate the course of her entire adult life,
as she sought to educate the American public about the true
meaning of democracy. It was a meaning that few would
grasp for more than a century, when women would finally
discover that, as Anthony and her peers had argued:
Women must vote, not because they have an axe to grind, not
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law,
May, 2001; The author wishes to thank the Honorable Michael A. Telesca,
Federal District Court Judge for the Western District of New York (and long-
time friend of "The Cause") for his inspiration in the crafting of this paper.
1. THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SusAN B. ANTHONY READER 204 (Ellen
Carol DuBois ed., 1992) [hereinafter READER].
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because it is their whim, not because men do it. It is not even
necessary that they make a special contribution as women. They
must vote because it is no longer possible for government to rest on
the consent of half the people.
Ironically, however, recent polls suggest that only about
fifteen percent of the general population nationwide, and
one-third of those in Anthony's home town, know who she
was.! Fewer still are likely aware that one of the first "legal
experiments" for suffragettes, desperate to have their cause
tried in the American courts, resulted in Anthony's arrest
in Rochester, New York in 1872 on the criminal charge that
she voted illegally.
Although the case of United States v. Anthony has
become a mere footnote in law books and high school
history texts, the case is nevertheless as sensational and
significant today as it was in Anthony's time. Anthony's
trial was the ideal forum for a timely, succinct, and
thorough presentation of the best-tailored arguments for
women's rights, and for the rights of all citizens under the
Civil War Amendments. The primary issue was suffrage,
but examination of the trial itself reveals that Anthony's
arguments were not merely an appeal for the vote, or a
quaint example of suffragist challenges to the law, but a
compelling prophecy of how women would use the vote to
change their status, and reform their context.
This comment will outline the socio-political context of
Anthony's life and philosophy, and examine United States v.
Anthony as it exemplified her time, and framed her
aspirations for suffrage and its potential for women to alter
the course of history. When Anthony's vision is compared to
the present reality, it appears that some results of suffrage
have fallen short of Anthony's expectations. The vote came
slowly and at a great price-and women's right to equality
as citizens has yet to be recognized fully, in legislation or in
practice.
2. OLIvIA COOLIDGE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS: THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA, 1848-1920 180 (1966) (emphasis added).
3. See Famous Women Not Well Known, FINGER LAKEs TIMES (Canandaigua,
N.Y.), July 29, 1999, at 4B; Erika Rosenberg, Poll Finds Ignorance of Anthony,
Stanton, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester, N.Y.), July 29, 1999, at Al.
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TRIAL AND TRIBULATION
A CONTEXT OF "SACRED DUTIES" : THE SOCIAL VIEW OF
NINETEENTH CENTURY WOMANHOOD
Susan B. Anthony was born into a nation laboring
under a centuries-old quandary: how to harvest the talents
of the woman citizen while ensuring her relative incapacity.
The nineteenth century solution to the problem of female
citizenship was the crafting and promotion of a distinctly
American ideal for women: that of the republican wife and
mother, a role owning the female equivalent of male
citizenship, yet "unencumbered" with the male citizen's
political and legal rights.4
Because the vast majority of nineteenth century women
married, choices for women consisted solely of the decision
either to adopt the role of spinster, or else to marry and
become a wife and mother.
The "spinster" stereotype of the wage-earning single
woman posed an unresolved contradiction, both in society
and in law. Single women, including Susan B. Anthony
herself, were largely rejected as unnatural creatures
existing in opposition to the societal and legal order.5 A
spinster was inevitably an anomaly, wandering the earth,
Cain-like, as a caste-less recluse, dependent on the charity
of relatives, or her own inferior paycheck, for support.
Understandably, spinsterhood was a fate which most
women, including those in the suffrage movement, sought
to avoid.6 As Susan B. Anthony wryly remarked:
4. SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY 57 (1989); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER
AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 50 (1991). Citizenship at the
Founding consisted of a confusing hodge-podge of ancient and "modern" ideas,
which led to problematic and contradictory characterizations of citizenship
based on race, gender, and wealth. James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Poverty and
Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 429 (1999).
5. The notion that singleness is an unnatural choice for women has endured
to the present and, translated into modem candor, has come to embrace the
suspicion that competent, single women who appear satisfied with only
academic and career success are "mannish" quasi-homosexuals. When United
States Attorney General Janet Reno sought re-election as Florida's Attorney
General, her opponents, and even a gay rights organization, accused the
unmarried Reno of being a closeted lesbian. Like many of her female political
predecessors, Reno has had to fight for society's acceptance of her as a woman
who is accomplished, feminine, and happy to be single: a self-described "old
maid who prefers men." DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE 50 MOST INFLUENTIAL
WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 266-72 (1996).
6. Illustrative of this attitude is the fact that Susan B. Anthony is the only
leader in the first generation of the women's movement who chose to remain
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Every woman must marry, either with or without love, for the
sake of support, or be doomed to a life of utter dependence, living
after the death of parents in the home of married brother or sister,
the drudge and burdenbearer of the family, without any financial
recompense, and usually looked upon with disrespect by the
children.
7
The ideal of republican motherhood held that a
woman's true nature fitted her perfectly-and solely-for
the dual roles of wife and mother.8 The republican mother
was delicate, timid, noble, and moral.9 She meekly exercised
her political role by raising patriotic sons, and thereby
enjoyed a civic identity separate from that of men, one
unmarried-and whose legacy history would later characterize, in surrender to
the stereotypes of her time, as that of a bitter old maid whose insurmountable
loneliness will forever permeate the cold stare she issues from her solitary
space on an unpopular coin. See READER, supra note 1, at 16. In fact, Anthony's
choice to remain single was not for lack of proposals; Anthony merely prioritized
her life differently from her peers, remarking that, "when I am crowned with all
the rights, privileges, and immunities of a citizen, I may give some
consideration to this social institution; but until then I must concentrate all of
my energies on the enfranchisement of my own sex." Id. When questioned about
her singleness, a condition not yet vindicated as a meaningful option unto itself
(and hence viewed strictly as a "lack of marriage"), Anthony replied with her
characteristic combination of political argument and wry sarcasm: "I would not
consent that the man I loved, described in the Constitution as a white male,
native born, American citizen, possessed of the right of self-government, eligible
to the office of president of the Great Republic, should unite his destinies in
marriage with a political slave and pariah." ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY
YEARs AND MORE: REMImISCENCES 1815-1897, at 172 (1898), reprinted in
KATHLEEN BARRY, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: A BIOGRAPHY OF A SINGULAR FEMINIST 38
(1988).
7. Susan B. Anthony, The Status of Woman, Past, Present, and Future, THE
ARENA, May 1897, at 902, quoted in BARRY, supra note 6, at 57.
8. According to an eighteenth century article: "[N]eedle work, the care of
domestic affairs, and a serious and retired life, is the proper function of women,
and for this they were designed by Providence." MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S
DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800,
at 4 (1980). When Myra Bradwell, a married woman, sued her home state of
Illinois for refusing her a license to practice law based on her gender, the Court
noted: "The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life." United
States v. Bradwell, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). See
generally BERRY, supra note 5, at 25-32.
9. Some suffragists would use this concept to argue for woman suffrage at
the local level, as granting women the vote in local and school elections would
"augment a women's ability to act competently within the sphere of particular
interest to her." Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars and Selves: Women's Tax Criticism
and Resistance in the 1870s, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 304 (1994).
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touted as essential to the welfare of the state. ° Exercise of
these qualities and demands would afford no opportunity
for her to actively participate in government, since "female
delicacy and reserve are incompatible with the duties of a
free elector."
11
Thus, the predominant definition of woman: that of a
wife and homemaker, united with her husband, yet
subordinate to him by nature, 2 prescribed a compelling and
narrowly-defined personality stereotype which applied to
virtually all women." The image of the placid, patriotic,
godly American housewife: a quaint angel whose deft,
gentle influence would guide her sons from the cradle to the
grave, heaped praise upon the character of every woman,
even while subverting her.'
10. EVANS, supra note 4, at 57. As unrealistic and even saccharine as it may
seem to the contemporary consciousness, it was an archetype that many were
loath to lose. As one anti-suffragist stated:
[Woman] gives us ideals of innocence and beauty. Innocence is
a woman; chastity is a woman; charity is a woman. I and you
do not wish to lose this ideal woman.... Bring women into the
strife [of politics], and what home will be secure against
discord, and what friendship safe from wreckage? The more
sacred duties of home, religion, and education, will be
sacrificed ....
The Rev. Father Walsh, Protest Against Woman Suffrage, Address at a Mass
Meeting Called by the Anti-Woman's Suffrage Association of Albany, N.Y.
(1905), reprinted in PAMPHLETS PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE WOMEN'S ANTI-
SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION (not paginated) (1990). The idea of woman as a powerful
guardian of patriotism is ironic, considering women's lack of political rights at
the time. As Abigail Adams noted, "[P]atriotism in the female Sex is the most
disinterested of all virtues." HOFF, supra note 4, at 54-55.
11. Judith Apter Klinghoffer & Lois Elkins, "The Petticoat Electors":
Women's Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159, 184
(1992).
12. See Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's Suffrage
Movement, 49 VAND. L. REV. 657, 658 (1996).
13. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAw: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 69 (1982).
14. This view of the inherent character of womankind was clearly reflected
in the era's verse:
Man is nerv'd with strength complete, / Woman beautiful we
meet.
Man is brave, though death be nigh, / Woman timid and will
fly.
Man is great in enterprise, / Woman great in suffering lies,
Man is best abroad displayed, / Woman loveliest in shade.
Man speaks when reason's ray he sees, / Woman to persuade
or please.
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Whether this politically passive role was carved out for
womankind because of her "delicate" qualities, or whether
the qualities were credited to her to accommodate the
stereotype, would become a central issue in the arguments
for suffrage. Whatever their genesis, the inherent
contradictions between quiet spinsterhood, republican
motherhood, and feminist activism would operate to
frustrate the goals of women suffragists as they stepped,
however softly, into the political arena.
A debilitating strike against early suffragettes was the
fact that the very tactics established by American
government and tradition for citizens to assert their rights,
including petitions to the government, speech-making, and
publication, were considered to be "unwomanly." Susan B.
Anthony would later recall that at that time, "[p]olitics
seemed a great deal farther away than paradise, and the
most radical reformer had not the prophetic eye which could
discern the woman politician." 5 Simon Greenleaf, outraged
by the public speeches of abolitionist-suffragettes Sarah
and Angelina Grimke, commented:
Should [a woman] choose to violate the proprieties of her station,
whether by traveling in the character of public lecturer, by
engaging with masculine energy in the distracting controversies of
the day, or by any occupation which custom and propriety have
assigned to the other sex, the law merely consigns her to the
tribunal of public opinion, and condemns her only to its withering
rebuke. 6
An 1852 New York Herald article described the women
suffragists thus: "Some of them... [have] so much of the
Man of rough unbending will, / Woman soft and tender still,
Man is bright by science [grac's] / Woman by superior taste.
Man judges with facility, / Woman with sensibility.
Man severely just you meet, / Woman beams in mercy sweet!
Klinghoffer & Elkins, supra note 11, at 191-92; see also Linda L. Ammons,
What's God Got to Do With It? Church and State Collaboration in the
Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 1207, 1257(1999) (listing the "four cardinal virtues" of nineteenth century womanhood as
"piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity," and noting that "[bly the end
of the nineteenth century virtue and femininity were synonymous.").
15. Susan B. Anthony, The Status of Woman, Past, Present, and Future, THE
ARENA 903 (May 1897), reprinted in BARRY, supra note 6, at 59.
16. Dianne Avery & Alfred Konefsky, The Daughters of Job: Property Rights
and Women's Lives in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 10 L. & HIST.
REV. 323, 332 (1992).
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virago of their disposition, that nature appears to have
made a mistake in their gender-[They are] mannish
women, like hens that crow .... ,,A7
Not surprisingly, suffragist enemies were swift to
caricature Anthony as a "strident spinster," with a "lean
and cadaverous" appearance. A Michigan newspaper
dubbed her, "the typical old maid, tall, angular and inclined
to be vinegar visaged.""8 While this characterization of
Anthony is but marginally accurate, it endures to the
present, and exemplifies a powerful and lasting
antifeminist weapon: the use of ruthless ridicule of a
woman's personal appearance and habits to denigrate her
political ideas. 9
Inescapably, suffragists such as Anthony would have to
fight to attain credibility as women. They would prove by
repetition that they could be effective political activists,
outlasting the criticism against them and yielding
themselves up as flagrant exceptions to the imposed role of
passive quietude. The desensitization of the public to
17. EVANS, supra note 4, at 102. Such stereotyping of suffragists has
pursued modern women's rights advocates to the present. See id.
18. JUDITH E. HARPER, SusAN B. ANTHONY: A BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 32
(1998).
19. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 102. The following anonymous telegram,
which was circulated throughout the United States and purportedly described
Anthony's arrival at a convention, was typical:
Miss Anthony stalked down the aisle with faded alpaca dress
to the top of her boots, blue cotton umbrella and white cotton
gloves, perched herself on the platform, crossed her legs,
pulled out her snuff-box and passed it around.... Susan was
quite drunk.
CONSTANCE BUEL BURNETr, FIVE FOR FREEDOM 239 (1953). Modem examples of
this tactic (generally employed against women in positions of extraordinary
authority or renown) include stinging nationwide criticism of the "unfeminine,"
or merely "unattractive" appearances of recent first lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno. See generally PAUL ANDERSON, JANET
RENO: DOING THE RIGHT THING 3-4 (1994). In the recent Clinton sex scandals
concerning the President's behavior toward such women as Paula Jones and
Monica Lewinsky, the press has disparaged Jones, Lewinsky, and Lewinsky's
infamously indiscrete friend Linda Tripp, for their less-than-modelesque
appearances, while President Clinton is evaluated solely (and more favorably)
by his conduct. The same is especially true for those women who align
themselves politically with women's "causes." As Barry comments, "This is the
same problem faced by the self-determined feminist of any age, whose
appearance-if it is not conventionally feminine-is caricatured in her own time
and to future generations as a way to discredit her ideas and politics." BARRY,
supra note 6, at 102-03.
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outspoken women would often require the forfeit of a
woman's dignity and public regard, and the shedding of
centuries of feminine tradition; but to Anthony, such a
sacrifice was well worth the ability to one day see her peers
understood as something greater than the stereotype." A
weary Anthony recorded in her diary during an early series
of abolitionist speaking engagements, "I am embarked in an
unpopular cause and must be content to row upstream."2'
Anthony was not, however, willing to grant herself the
slightest respite from publicizing "the Cause,"-nor would
she allow her fellow suffragists' enthusiasm to grow cold in
the name of the contrived nineteenth-century version of
femininity. In 1856, Anthony charged her bosom friend
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, married and a mother many times
over, to assume the dual roles of republican mother and
suffrage reformer, and aid her in composing a speech: "So,
for the love of me and for the saving of the reputation of
womanhood, I beg you, with one baby on your knee and
another at your feet and four boys whistling, buzzing,
20. Matilda Joslyn Gage would advance the republican rights of individual
women over republican motherhood in her speeches prior to Anthony's trial:
"Three names, said to be the sweetest the world ever knew, are mother, home,
and heaven. There is one still sweeter-one for which men have given up
mother and home, and for which they have almost sacrificed the hope of heaven;
that word is LIBERTY." AN ACcOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIAL OF
SusAN B. ANTHONY ON THE CHARGE OF ILLEGAL VOTING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IN NOVEMBER, 1872, at 180 (1974) [hereinafter United States v.
Anthony transcript]. The account is reprinted from the original 1874 version,
assembled by Anthony to contain the stenographic minutes of the trial, the
Judge's opinion, and critical comment on the verdict. An advertisement for the
publication asserted that "t]he record has a historical value; if it marks the
turn of the tide it will show hereafter how high the flood has been. If the tide
does not turn it stands to show where the battle was fought, and tell the future
of its earnest, sanguinary character." FORT SCOTT DAILY MONITOR, May 8, 1874,
in SCRAPBooi: A SCRAPBOOK OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS ABOUT THE FARmERS' AND
MECHANICS' BANK BEING BANKRUPT, compiled by Hector MacLean, Rochester
Public Library, Local History Division, Rochester, NY (1855-1882) [hereinafter
MACLEAN SCRAPBOOK]. Only three thousand copies of the pamphlet were printed
by the Daily Democrat and Chronicle Book Print, and distributed in Rochester
and elsewhere, and the record is now considered a valuable museum piece. John
Van Voorhis, Speech at Rochester, New York on the One Hundredth
Anniversary of Anthony's Trial (June 18, 1973) (transcript on file with the
Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter John Van Voorhis Speech]; Interview with
Eugene Van Voorhis, great-grandson of John Van Voorhis, Anthony's trial co-
counsel, in Rochester, N.Y. (Jan. 28, 2000).
21. IDA HUSTED HARPER, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 120
(1898).
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hallooing 'Ma, Ma,' set yourself about the work."22
Anthony and her followers offered, instead of republican
motherhood, a "new true woman," a blueprint for the
woman of the future:
The true woman will not be exponent of another, or allow another
to be such for her. She will be her own individual self,--do her own
individual work,-stand or fall by her own individual wisdom and
strength.... She will proclaim the "glad tidings of good news" to
all women, that [woman] equally with man was made for her own
individual happiness, to develop every power of her three-fold
nature, to use, worthily, every talent given her by God, in the
23great work of life, to the best advantage of herself and the race.
The strategy which Anthony, and other suffragists,
adopted to bring their "new woman" to the forefront, would
become a prototype for the protestations of oppressed
groups until the present time. The suffragists published
their claims as evidence of moral injustice, pursued legal
means of empowerment, and finally, when those methods
proved fruitless, proceeded to openly violate contested laws
in order to demonstrate their injustice.' It is this third step,
the open violation of an unjust law, which would place
Anthony at the forefront of the movement; poised alone
before a hostile bench to await the sentence of half of a
nation.
22. EVANS, supra note 4, at 103. Stanton was outspoken about her
frustration with the role prescribed for her. She noted in her biography:
The general discontent I felt with woman's portion as wife, mother,
housekeeper, physician, and spiritual guide... and the wearied,
anxious look of the majority of women impressed me with a strong
feeling that some active measures should be taken to remedy the
wrongs of society in general, and of women in particular.
Martha Minow, Rights of One's Own, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1084, 1084 (1985) (book
review of ELIZABETH GlUFFI, IN HER OWN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON (1984)).
23. Susan B. Anthony, True Womanhood, speech delivered in 1857 and
1859, reprinted in HARPER, supra note 21, at 172.
24. See Martin C. Loesch, Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience
Justification, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHIcs & PUB. PoLY 1069, 1081 (1991). See
generally Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles
for Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723 (1991).
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WOMEN "UNDER COVER": THE LEGAL POSITION OF
NINETEENTH-CENTURY WOMANHOOD
Republican motherhood and spinsterhood were more
than American social or philosophical constructs: they were
the romantic idealizations of women's legal position which
had evolved from the time of the Revolution. Despite
championing the concepts of "liberty" and "independence,"
the American Revolution had not made women "bona-fide
citizens of the new republic," nor did it change the status of
married or single women to allow their participation in
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."" Although the
Constitution and Bill of Rights did not explicitly deny equal
rights to women, one may assume "that the Framers
envisioned no [politically involved] role for women in the
new American government."'
Constitutional silence concerning the role of women in
democracy was most probably the result, not of an
affirmative intent to exclude women, but of hundreds of
years of contradictory precedent defining women as legally
dependant, and reasoning that they were therefore
incompetent to exercise the rights of citizenship. The
concept of women's legal status in the nineteenth century
was derived in part from the ways in which men had
selectively interpreted, and instituted, Judeo-Christian
principles of marriage and property for centuries. 7 Scholars
25. See HOFF, supra note 4, at 49. In an interesting exception, the New
Jersey Constitution of 1776, which neglected to mention the gender of its voters,
allowed single white women in that state to vote for three decades, until the
state legislature reinterpreted the suffrage clause and defined voters as male
taxpaying citizens in 1807. Evidence suggests that the failure to include a
gender qualification was deliberate, and largely a result of Quaker influence.
See Klinghoffer & Elkins, supra note 11, at 159-60.
26. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 658.
27. Blackstone's commentaries, published in 1765, provide a concise
description of this arrangement: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one
person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, reprinted in LAUREL ULRICH, GOOD WIVEs: IMAGE AND REALITY IN
THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND, 1650-1750, at 7 (1980). In the
course of the nineteenth century, Blackstone's absolutist concepts were replaced
with a dialectic of "legal relations among persons" rather than "dominion over
things," but improvements for married women were slow in coming. See HOFF,
supra note 4, at 49. Susan B. Anthony referred to the Blackstonian
990 [Vol. 48
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concede that law is both a result of, and a means of
classifying, "complex social actions and interactions."28
Thus, selected Christian principles, combined with
remnants of feudal law, democratic philosophy, and the
sharply-tailored Blackstonian theories of natural law,
served as the bases for nineteenth century Americans to
define the family, reducing it to a distinct set of legal
relationships.29 In the eighteenth century, an unmarried
woman had been viewed as the property of her father; a
married woman was the property of her husband."0
Nineteenth century legal commentators would soften the
descriptive terms, describing a woman's husband as her
"guardian... bound to protect and maintain her," but
application of the common law would largely remain
intact."' Because in marriage "the two [became] one flesh,"
it was concluded that women were therefore generally
unable to contract or autonomously manage property in the
absence of a husband's consent.32 A woman could not
characterization of marriage as she did to slavery, calling it a "blot on
civilization." See BARRY, supra note 6, at 13. See generally Ammons, supra note
14, at 1207.
28. See Ammons, supra note 14, at 1208.
29. See, e.g., BASCH, supra note 13, at 46-47; Ammons, supra note 14, at
1250-53.
30. See Janice L. Richter, We Have Waited So Long: The Story of Alice Paul,
171 N.J. L. 25, 26 (1995). This arrangement, although facially unequal,
must not be wrenched from the larger concept of an organic social order
in which rights and responsibilities were reciprocal and in which terms
like individuality or self-reliance had little place .... In the hierarchical
structure which sustained the social order, one human being was of
necessity almost always subject to another-child to parent, servant to
master, subject to ruler.
ULRICH, supra note 27, at 8. See generally Carol Shammas, Early American
Woman and Control over Capital, in WOMEN IN THE AGE OF THE AMERiCAN
REVOLUTION 150-154 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1989).
31. See BASCH, supra note 13, at 62-64.
32. Mark 10:7-8. Although nineteenth century courts did not decline to
comment that "[tlhe paramount destiny and mission of woman [is] to [fulfill] the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother[:l This is the law of the Creator,"
analyses of the legal rights of women in the nineteenth century were often
fielded by ministers and theologians. See United States v. Bradwell, 83 U.S.
130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). Religious arguments against women's
rights were premised on the idea that Christian principles, as traditionally
interpreted them, were the basis for all true civilization. See Avery & Konefsky,
supra note 16, at 333 (describing Simon Greenleafs reaction to the writings of
Sarah Grimke, wherein he argued that "the influence of Christianity... has
given woman a new station in society, releasing her from bondage"). Many
notable women rebelled against such use of the Bible as justification for the
992 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 48
independently sue or be sued in court, make contracts, or
buy or sell property as freely as a man." Wage-earning
existing property law. Abolitionist and suffragette Sarah Grimke "built a
foundation" for her views on women's rights based on "her own (secret) studies
of the law, and her knowledge of the Bible." Id. Appealing to the pervasive
nineteenth century respect for the Bible as the basis for defining interpersonal
and legal relationships, she declared: "I shall depend solely on the Bible to
designate the sphere of woman, because I believe almost every thing that has
been written on this subject, has been the result of a misconception of the
simple truths revealed in the Scriptures ... ." Id. at 328.
One of Griike's contemporaries wrote Simon Greenleaf to assert that, "if a
woman dies a week after she is married... her husband takes all her personal
property and the use of her real estate as long as he lives-if a man dies his
wife can have her thirds-this does not come up to the Gospel rule [that one
must do unto others as you would others should do unto you]." Id. at 327.
Olympia Brown, the first denominationally ordained female minister in the
United States, found that the Biblical picture of women "rebukes such
ignorance and narrow, unjust judgment [of women].... Wherever ... society is
governed by Christian principle, there the soul of woman [ought] to be
recognized, her intellect cultivated and her liberty secured." DANA GREENE,
SUFFRAGE AND RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF OLYMPIA
BROWN 13, 60 (1984).
The translation of Christian theology into nineteenth century marriage and
property law did effect an ironic twist on the Biblical model for marriage and
female status, considering that the Bible's Proverbial "virtuous wife" is
described buying property, deciding how to use its profits, and selling
merchandise of her own volition. Proverbs 31:10, 16, 18, 24, 28-29. Most likely
the Biblical impetus for subjection of woman was derived from the command,
"Wives, submit to your own husbands, as to the Lord." Ephesians 5:22.
Commentators such as Greenleaf do not appear to have so widely publicized the
command to husbands to "love your wives, just as Christ also loved the church
and gave Himself for her.... So husbands ought to love their own wives as
their own bodies." Ephesians 5:25, 28. Taken together, these commands suggest
a partnership in which women are lower in power, but command a higher
degree of sacrificial love and consideration from their male counterparts:
"Nevertheless let each one of you in particular so love his own wife as himself,
and let the wife see that she respects her husband." Ephesians 5:33. Thus,
Biblical profiles of marriage, on their face, suggest more of an emphasis on
loving cooperation in a role-differentiated partnership than abject subjection.
Women are described taking equal initiative with men, not only in business, see
Proverbs, supra, but in private spiritual instruction and ministry (Acts 18:1, 26),
marital sexual intimacy (Song of Solomon 7:10-12), and in acting as leaders and
judges for the nation. (Judges 4:4-9). But see limits on women's right to contract
as a daughter and a wife, Numbers 30:3-16; Avery & Konefsky, supra note 16,
at 327 (discussing Mosaic inheritance laws). The apostle Paul described
Christianity itself as the great leveler of human relationships: "ihere is neither
Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female;
for you are all one in Christ Jesus." Galatians 3:28.
33. NORTON, supra note 8, at 46; Sarah B. Lawsky, A Nineteenth
Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 783, 811-
12 (2000).
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women's salaries, and even the debts owed them,34 fell
under the jurisdiction of their husbands, as did any
property owned by them previous to the marriage. 35 In most
cases, a woman's children were under her husband's sole
control and guardianship.36 A woman's very person also
became the property of her husband, who could legally rape,
restrain, or beat her, inflicting such corporal punishment
for the purpose of "moderate correction."37 What legal
protection married women did enjoy included a right to
dower in their husbands' estates amounting to one-third of
the family property at his death/
8
As legal historians are swift to point out, the "two-as-
one" concept of married women was largely an invention of
the law, "reduc[ing] a complex legal relationship to a crude
metaphor." As Anthony reflected:
In the depths of my soul there is a continual denial of the self-
annihilating spiritual or legal union of two human beings. Such
union... must bring an end to the free action of one or the other,
and it matters not to the individual whose freedom has thus
departed whether it be the gentle rule of love or the iron hand of
law which blotted out from the immortal being the individual soul-
stamp of the Good Father. How I do wish those who know
something of the real social needs of our age would rescue this
greatest, deepest, highest question from the present
34. See Richter, supra note 30, at 26.
35. See NORTON, supra note 8, at 46.
36. See id.; BASOH, supra note 13, at 65 (noting as an exception to the rule of
paternal custody that nineteenth century equity would tend to confer custody of
a young daughter upon the mother).
37. See Ammons, supra note 14, at 1253 (reiterating Blackstone's common
law assertion that "the husband [may do] any violence to his wife ... [which]
lawfully and reasonabl(y) belongs to [him] for [her] due government and
correction"). This "right of chastisement" principle was adopted by the Colonial
Courts. See id. at 1255-56, 1260-61. The condoning of wife-beating by the courts
became so prevalent that the Ku Klux Klan would later adopt it (albeit
unsuccessfully) as a justification for the assault of male ex-slaves and their
Republican supporters. See id. at 1261. Marital rape was considered an
oxymoron, for "by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband." Lawsky, supra note 33, at 812.
This arrangement, therefore, made it impossible for a wife to control the
number of children she would have, or when she would have them. See id.
38. See NORTON, supra note 8, at 46. Predictably, husbands enjoyed a much
larger inheritance expectation from their wives through curtesy. See BASCH,
supra note 13, at 52-53.
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unphilosophical, unspiritual discussers.
Anthony's abolitionist friend, Parker Pillsbury, noted:
There are laws for woman, as woman, wife, mother, widow, some
of them cruel and unjust; but no woman made them. There are
laws of marriage and divorce, and women marry and are
divorced-sometimes most diabolically divorced, if not more
diabolically married. But women make no marriage or divorce
laws; they only suffer them, or suffer from them.
40
Despite vehement opposition by Anthony and others,
the nineteenth century view of marriage remained as one
which "classified married women so comprehensively that
exceptions were just that. No single precedent or statute
could compete with the hegemony of the ancient legal
fiction."' Modern critics have added that the "legal fiction"
of marriage retained its resiliency because "it exerted
linguistic hegemony over all who used it."42 As a metaphor,
it could be inverted to justify the nineteenth century
perception of natural law, or natural law could be used to
bolster it. From whatever stance the nineteenth century
mind approached the concept, the law, the reality, and the
natural order would appear in harmony. Only a few
pioneering women would challenge the ideal of republican
motherhood and remove what it disguised, that the
Constitution of the United States had bequeathed to women
"a citizenship without substance. '
The Married Women's Property Acts surfaced in 1848,
due in part to vigorous feminist activism.44 The Acts did
generate measurable improvements in some aspects of
women's status.45 Statistics demonstrate that, after the
passage of the Property Acts, propertied and wage-earning
39. See HARPER, supra note 21, at 171.
40. PARKER PILLSBURY, ECCLESIASTICAL vs. CIviL AUTHORITY: GOD IN THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: MAN AND WOMAN OUT 10 (3d ed., 1894).
41. See BASCH, supra note 13, at 42-43.
42. See id. at 69.
43. See Jennifer Y. Brown, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's
Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175, 2179-80 (1993).
44. See Ammons, supra note 14, at 1262.
45. See Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women's Property Acts,
6 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 14 (1994). Anthony's efforts, including her solicitation of
thousands of petition signatures, were significant in bringing about New York's
revision of marriage and property laws. See MILDRED ADAMS, THE RIGHT To BE
PEOPLE 39 (1967).
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women were freer to invest, spend, and bequeath their
wealth as they wished.46 However, such improvements were
limited by judicial "paring down" by the courts soon after
their enactment.47 While the Acts should have offered all
women increased powers to contract freely, and to
independently retain their earnings as part of a separate
estate, the New York appellate and Supreme Courts soon
ruled that: the Acts only applied to marriages occurring
after 1848, that married women would have to specify that
their estate bear the debt of their contracts, and that, in
order to claim their earnings, the earnings had to originate
from a third party, be unconnected to household activities,
and be specified under a separate account.8
Of course, the single, wage-earning woman stands out
as a flagrant exception to the historical justifications for the
lack of legal protection for women. Such women were
legally in a position of limbo; adults beyond the scope of
ownership by their fathers, and single women outside of a
husband's control. Nevertheless, they possessed a legal
autonomy unparalleled by the status of their married
sisters: under the common law, unmarried women could
own and convey property, author wills, sue and be sued,
and enjoy freedom to contract.49 Why these women, to whom
contractual and ownership rights were extended equally
with men, were denied the vote under the nineteenth
century rationale of male supremacy and limited
citizenship for the legally weaker sex, is a question largely
unanswered by the historical record." Perhaps the best
answer is simply that, as the minority, such women were
easily dismissed as a politically voiceless, economically
powerless, and socially disdained contradiction to the rule-
a contradiction easily ignored until the rise of women, like
46. See generally Shammas, supra note 45, at 14.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 15.
49. See Avery & Konefsky, supra note 16, at 326.
50. New Jersey did adopt this rationale for a time by allowing single,
property-holding women to vote from 1776-1807. See Klinghoffer & Elkins,
supra note 11, at 159-60; supra note 24 and accompanying text. For the rest of
the nation, it is likely that the sheer minority of such women was reason
enough to ignore the question of their suffrage, at least initially. It is probably
no coincidence that, as industrialization exponentially increased the number of
single women of independent means, the latter generations of the suffrage
movement, like the American population, would note a prodigiously larger (and
more insistent) percentage of single women in their ranks.
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Anthony, who would call unto themselves the attention that
their predecessors had lacked.
"PRIVILEGES" AND "IMMUNITIES": THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND CITIZENSHIP
The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment gave birth
to a new hope for nineteenth-century suffragistsrAlthough
the Amendment's effect and intent were to enfranchise
Negro citizens during Reconstruction, and presumably only
males, Anthony and others believed that the Amendment
supported the principle that voting was a privilege of all
citizens, not to be abridged by the government. Those
supporting this construction read the amendment, not as an
extension of the vote to some citizens, but as a vindication
of the right of all citizens of the United States, regardless of
color (or gender), not to have the vote denied to them. As
some modern critiques have suggested, such expansion of
the plain-language meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
was not an illogical step, considering the extensive lobbying
of Congress by suffragists and Congress' drafting of the
Amendment in such a way that it did not explicitly limit its
application to Negro citizens."
In marked contrast to conventional conceptions of
constitutional law, Anthony relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment "privileges and immunities" guarantee, rather
than the "equal protection" clause, as the constitutional
basis of her arguments for women suffrage. Although there
are several possible reasons for this departure from what is
51. The Amendment provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.... Section 5. The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
52. See Nina Morals, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment:
Lost History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153, 1154 (1988). For a general discussion of the
crafting of the Amendment, see JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES,
1789-1995, at 139-40 (1996).
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now a fundamental precept of constitutional law, Anthony's
argument, if perhaps deficient in its neglect of the equal
protection issue, is merely a reflection of the legal mind-set
of her time.
Competing theories of citizenship had enjoyed a place at
the forefront of democratic political thought, philosophy,
and legal discussion since before the American Revolution,
and the concept remained indefinite throughout the
Founding period.53 It was not until the passage of the
Reconstruction Amendments that the federal government
explicitly defined citizenship, and proclaimed Congress'
53. See Fox, supra note 4, at 479. Although Anthony's trial would apply
post-Civil War interpretations of citizenship, it is important to note the history
of citizenship between the Founding period and Civil War. An extensive
discussion was provided by Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell to
hold a discriminatory statute, which allowed seizure by a New Jersey resident
of a non-resident's property, not violative of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823); U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2. Washington stated in dicta that:
[wihat these fundamental principles [which the Constitution protects
as the natural rights, privileges and immunities of citizenship] are, it
would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
[government protection, free travel, the writ of habeas corpus, access to
the courts, and the right to hold and use property], to which may be
added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws
or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added). Thus limited,
Washington's view of the Privileges and Immunities clause would only
"ensure... that states could not discriminate against non-residents in the
application of whatever state laws regulated the franchise." See Fox, supra note
4, at 483. Still, his list was more suggestive than restrictive, and would echo,
ironically, in the pages of the later Dred Scott decision, which, like Corfield, set
forth an expansive list of fundamental rights, even while denying them to the
litigant. See id. at 484; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that,
while the rights of national citizenship are legion, slavery's institutionalized,
court-sanctioned denial of the privileges and immunities accorded to citizens
leads logically to the conclusion that African-Americans are not United States
citizens). The Fourteenth Amendment would reverse this logic by defining
citizenship inclusively, and leading courts to identify restrictions on "privileges
and immunities" as constitutional violations, rather than proof of one's non-
citizen status. See generally Fox, supra note 4, at 489-90. Ironically, Harriet
Scott (Mrs. Dred Scott), who filed her own suit for personal freedom, was
unacknowledged by the Supreme Court in her own time, and remains so by
historical accounts today. See Karin Mika, Self-Reflection Within the Academy:
The Absence of Women in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 273, 274 (1998), citing Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs.
Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997).
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power to expand upon and enforce its privileges.54 The
Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery; the Fourteenth
enforced its predecessor "by enacting the natural rights
which, according to some pre-war interpretations were
among the rights and privileges of citizenship.";t The
Fourteenth Amendment also signaled the primacy of a
nationalist theory of citizenship, a racially blind (and
linguistically gender-neutral), equally applicable
categorization of nationalized citizenship, over the tiered
citizenship initially advanced by many slavery advocates.5
Yet, although the Amendment clarified who citizens
were, the "privileges and immunities" of the status were left
undefined. Given the meticulous attention dedicated to the
conception and drafting of the Reconstruction Amendments,
it is unlikely that the clause was vague due to oversight.
Rather, the framers of the Amendment "understood that
citizenship was an evolving concept.... [T]hey chose to
enable future generations .. to develop further the
privileges and immunities of citizenship."' It was this
flexibility, the Fourteenth Amendment's seeming support of
a nationalistic approach, and the timeliness of the debate,
that Anthony and her followers hoped to exploit in bringing
women's suffrage to the political forefront.
The Slaughterhouse Cases, decided shortly before
Anthony's trial, sharply limited the "privileges and
immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
proved a formidable obstacle for Anthony's arguments
during her trial." The Supreme Court had functionally
truncated the Amendment by rejecting Congress' theory of
U.S. citizenship and congressionally-enforceable rights, and
holding that the natural rights to life, liberty and property
(and the civil rights adjunct to them) were to be solely
54. See Fox, supra note 4, at 490-92.
55. See id. at 493.
56. See id. at 498; Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 562-63 (McLean, J., dissenting),
582-88 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a tiered citizenship, which would
bar discrimination against members of the same citizenship level, but would
allow citizens at different levels to claim different kinds of privileges and
immunities, is most consistent with the Framers' intent, and most preferable).
57. See Fox, supra note 4, at 504.
58. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas 829, 830 (N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No.
14,459) (stating that "[state and federal] rights are separate and distinct, [as]
was held in the Slaughterhouse Cases... recently decided by the supreme
court").
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state-conferred and state-regulated.59  Nevertheless,
believing the Slaughterhouse Cases to be wrongly decided,
Anthony pressed in her arguments for a closer look at the
Amendment's true meaning.
COMMON WOMAN TO CRUSADER: SUSAN B. ANTHONY'S
BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
The story of Susan B. Anthony is one best appreciated
in the softened glow of retrospect, viewed with the benefit of
ideas that Anthony possessed so far ahead of her
contemporaries that she could not convince the nation of
their rectitude, but merely offer herself as a herald of the
women to come. While raised a product of her own century,
Anthony would become, in her maturity, an anachronism,
an ambassador of moral, legal, and societal principles not
officially embraced in her lifetime, but adopted (with much
fanfare) afterwards. ° At the same time, Susan's upbringing
and young adulthood bore, not the earmarks of greatness or
the singular sparkle of prodigy' but rather, the marks of a
"common woman" of her time.6 Because such a beginning
was logically necessary for an uncommon woman to
represent, with understanding and compassion, the millions
of "common women" of America, Susan B. Anthony's history
and background would contribute significantly to her
position as the ideal defendant in her symbolic trial for
illegal voting.
Susan Brownell Anthony was born into a prominent
family in Adams, Massachusetts on February 15, 1820.2
Anthony's father was an esteemed Quaker, and Anthony's
Quaker upbringing afforded her an early glimpse, one
unusual for her time, of women in positions of equality and
authority.63 Her grandmother was an elder in the Quaker
59. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98
YALE L.J. 565, 591. What the Slaughterhouse Court did identify as federal civil
rights included the right to protection abroad, the right to navigate national
waterways, interstate travel, and the right to petition Congress for the redress
of grievances. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1872).
Anthony would later petition Congress unsuccessfully to appeal the outcome of
her trial. Her appeal is described at infra note 204 and accompanying text.
60. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 12.
61. See id.
62. See HARPER, supra note 18, at 20.
63. Quakers were the only religious sect which allowed women to hold
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Meeting and a member of the High Seat.' Susan's father,
Daniel, promoted the highest educational opportunities for
Susan and her sisters, establishing a school for his children,
those of his neighbors, and the girls who worked at his
mills, and employing highly educated women as their
teachers.65
Anthony's personality was not only keenly intelligent,
but sensitive and warm. She was, in life, a vibrant, witty
contradiction to the history classroom's characterization of
her as a stern old maid. Throughout her life, Anthony was
as passionately devoted to the people and places she loved
as she was to her "causes." Fourteen-year-old Susan
displayed her keen love of family, and "womanly" devotion
to home in verse:
... each one loves
One little spot in which her heart unfolds
With nature's holiest feelings; one sweet spot,
And calls it Home! If sorrow is felt there
It runs through many bosoms, and a smile
Lights upon in kindred eyes a smile
And if disease intrudes, the sufferer finds
Rest on the breast beloved.6 6
Bequeathing her literary skills to others, Susan began
her teaching career at the tender age of fifteen, and quickly
discovered that her salary, although awarded for equal
positions of authority in the church. See ULRICH, supra note 27, at 9. Quaker
influence is credited with effecting the only post-Revolutionary state
constitution which did not include a gender qualification for the vote. See
Klinghoffer & Elkins, supra note 11, at 168; see also supra note 25 (discussing
New Jersey's omission of a gender qualification for voters). But see Linda
Castle, Susan B. Anthony, Reformer, 59 A.B.A. J. 526 (1973) (explaining that
many Quakers, Anthony's father, Daniel, included, did not vote because they
considered it wrong to support a government that, in opposition to Quaker
ideology, promoted war).
64. See HARPER, supra note 18, at 21.
65. See id.; BARRY, supra note 6, at 18-21.
66. Susan B. Anthony, Home, reprinted in Barry, supra note 6, at 24.
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work, was far below that of her male peers."7 Susan would
eventually attend Quaker Deborah Moulson's boarding
school outside Philadelphia, and prove herself to be an apt
and exacting pupil, whether seriously engrossed in
attaining pious moral perfection, or pursuing her newly-
acquired interests in science and mathematics."
Upon graduation from Moulson's school, Susan
returned home to find her family in financial trouble
following the Panic of 1837 and subsequent depression.69
Susan's attitude in the face of family difficulty reflected the
relentless and hopeful spirit that would sustain her in her
quests to come: "Let the future bring what it may, our
happiness is far more complete to live an upright life."'
Susan's teaching income would be dedicated to sustaining
her family for the next several years, during which they
relocated to Rochester, New York." Rochester would become
Susan's lifelong "home base," and the place from which her
interests as a reformer for her three favorite causes-
temperance, abolition, and women's suffrage-would
flourish. 2
Anthony's years as a reformer in these movements gave
her ample opportunity to gain experience as a speaker and
writer, and hone the skills that would become necessary to
publicize her trial for illegal voting years later. In general,
women temperance reformers and abolitionists gained
invaluable practice in framing and presenting arguments
and speeches which were powerful and effective, and which
would prove a vast resource to the cause of suffrage later
67. See HARPER, supra note 18, at 22.
68. See id. at 23. Susan's academic success was not without some measure of
struggle. In addition to her exacting standards for her own performance, Susan
had to contend with what today would be considered a learning disability: her
left eye had been "crossed" since childhood, a condition which gave her
considerable trouble reading. As a young Anthony explained: "My eyes held in
performing their wanted office... [Often do their nonconformance mortify this
frail heart, when attempting to read in class." BARRY, supra note 6, at 26; Susan
B. Anthony Diary, June 22, 1839, Schlesinger Library on the History of Women
in America, Radcliffe, reprinted in BARRY, supra note 6, at 26.
69. See HARPER, supra note 18, at 24.
70. Susan B. Anthony Diary, supra note 68, reprinted in BARRY, supra note
6, at 31.
71. See HARPER, supra note 18, at 24.
72. See EMERSON KLEES, THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE FINGER
LAKES REGION 15 (1998).
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on.73 Anthony became proficient in constitutional law and
American legal history, far surpassing the knowledge of the
legislators and presidents she would lobby for decades.74
Anthony's activism was instrumental in the abolitionist
movement, as it would be in the women's movement which
was its offspring.75 Her efforts were equally significant in
New York's revision of married women's property rights.76
Such victories only fueled Anthony's fire; her principal
goal was to secure social and legal equality for women
through the vote. The premise for her crusade was not
simply that women had a right to vote, but that "all men
and women are created equal"; the vote was merely the
most glaring violation of that equality in the United
States." Given the nineteenth-century view that votes were
the foremost means to political power, and "the very
substance of [democratic] self-government," Anthony saw
the rights of women as a body hinged most directly on
enfranchisement.78 Speaking to Ontario County residents in
the days preceding Anthony's trial, her friend and ally
Matilda Joslyn Gage declared:
[The consent of the governed comes by] and through the ballot
alone... It declares what principles shall rule; it says what laws
shall be made, it tells what taxes are to be raised; it places men in
office or lays their heads low in the dust. It is the will of a man
embodied in that little piece of paper; it is the consent of the
governed. 9
Thus, Anthony's trial for illegal voting represented
much more than a fight over women's voting rights; it
symbolized a struggle for women's equality, and for the
power to reform society through the most expedient means
available: the vote.0
73. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 22; O'Connor, supra note 12, at 658.
74. See HARPER, supra note 18, at xvi.
75. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 21; O'Connor, supra note 12, at 658.
76. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 39.
77. See Brown, supra note 43, at 2177.
78. See HARPER, supra note 18, at xvii-xviii; Brown, supra note 43, at 2177.
79. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 179.
80. See HARPER, supra note 18, at xviii.
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'WILLING To BE ANYTHING OR NOTHING": ANTHONY'S VOTE
AND ARREST
Susan B. Anthony believed that: "[c]autious, careful
people.., never can bring about a reform. Those who are
really in earnest must be willing to be anything or nothing
in the world's estimation, and publicly.., avow their
sympathy with despised and persecuted ideas and their
advocates, and bear the consequences."8
Anthony's act of voting, her trial, and the educational
publicity campaign she would launch between the two,
demonstrated to the country that Anthony was willing to
place her reputation upon the altar of her cause, and to
"bear the consequences" of civil disobedience.
Upon returning from one of her many speaking tours,
during which she had repeatedly argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment supported women suffrage,
Anthony chose to test her words against the law she had
been publicly interpreting for years." Specifically, she
would try the Fourteenth Amendment with an attempt at
voter registration, and once denied, institute a civil suit
which could be carried to the Supreme Court.' Such a
81. See KLEES, supra note 72, at 14. Anthony's words reflect a sophisticated
understanding of civil disobedience well ahead of her time. Commentator
Martin C. Loesch describes this dichotomy of respect for government, and for
conscience, as that most largely embraced by modern democracies as the
acceptable means of enacting (limited) protest. It is a delicate balance which
requires that the civil disobedient:
1. have exhausted all available constitutional means (to demonstrate
that law should be broken only when necessary),
2. be willing to face arrest and punishment (by which the dissenter
acknowledges respect for the legal system),
3. have full knowledge of the law broken,
4. engage in only nonviolent expressions of dissent (note that this
condition is especially controversial), and
5. make her disobedience public to acknowledge her respect for the
interests of other people.
Loesch, supra note 24, at 1094. A facial analysis of Anthony's actions reveals
that she shares these characteristics of the modern disobedient.
82. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 62; KATHERmE ANTHONY, SUSAN B.
ANTHONY: HER PERSONAL HISTORY AND HER ERA 277 (1954).
83. See ANNE F. SCOTT & ANDREW M. ScOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE
FIGHT FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE 19 (1975).
84. See id. About 150 women in several states attempted to vote in 1871 and
1872, several of whom instituted civil suits after being turned away from the
polls, but Anthony's criminal case exceeded them all in publicity and import.
See CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NE=rlE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND
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course was consistent with nineteenth-century
constitutional interpretations, which had, since the
contemplation of the Thirteenth Amendment, held that an
individual's appeal to the federal courts (and not
Congressional regulation) was the most effective remedy for
violation by a state officer of one's constitutional rights.5
On November 1, 1872, the city of Rochester saw
Anthony and fifteen of her bravest followers respond to the
call to register.86 About fifty women made their way to voter
registration desks throughout the region, demanding to be
registered, but only one group, headed by Anthony and
descending upon the registration inspectors in a shop in the
Eighth Ward, was allowed to do so. 7 When the inspectors
POLrrIcs: THE INNER STORY OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 92-93 (1926). Virginia
Minor, a Missouri resident who had been turned away from the polls on October
15, 1872, embarked on an identical plan. The year after Anthony's trial, the
Supreme Court would rule that while Minor was a citizen of the United States,
"the Constitution ha[d] not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and
immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time [the Fourteenth
Amendment] was adopted." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 171 (1874).
85. Kaczorowski, supra note 59, at 579 (stating that the only "certain federal
remedy" for civil rights violations by a state had been "indirect and inefficient"
appeal to the Supreme Court under section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act of
1789, and asserting that "[tihe framers [of the Thirteenth Amendment]
expressed their intention to provide more effective remedies by conferring on
the federal courts jurisdiction to administer relief directly").
86. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 277-78. Posters and notices
in the morning papers, prompting registration, had been gender neutral, less an
indication that women were being addressed, than that the idea of women
voting was so absurd to the publishers that gender-specific terms wouldn't have
appeared necessary:
Now register! ... If you were not permitted to vote, you would fight for
the right, undergo all privations for it, face death for it.... You have it
now at the cost of five minutes' time... hundreds of you are likely to
lose your votes because you have not thought it worth while to give the
five minutes. To-day and to-morrow are your only opportunities.
Register now!
Id. at 278. The prediction that "[i]f you were not permitted to vote, you would
fight for the right, undergo all privations for it" is an ironic and accurate
description of Anthony's life quest, which would be introduced into legal history
the moment she placed her name on the register. Unfortunately for the women
of her century, the legitimate voter registration of women would take infinitely
longer than "five minutes' time."
87. See ADAMs, supra note 45, at 62. Although several of the women were
Quakers and could not swear the necessary oath without breaking from the
tenets of their faith, the law had made special arrangements for the sect and
they were allowed to affirm their registration. Anthony, contrary to her usual
adherence to Quaker beliefs, took the oath. See ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 278.
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hesitated, Anthony read aloud both the New York State
election law and the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining
that neither forbade women to vote.88 Anthony concluded
with a personal threat to the stunned inspectors: "If you
refuse us our rights as citizens, I will bring charges against
you in Criminal Court and I will sue each of you personally
for large, exemplary damages!," and added, "I know I can
win. I have Judge Selden as a lawyer."89 Shaken and
convinced, the inspectors allowed the women to register.-
The Rochester afternoon papers, speedily appraised of
the situation, called for the arrest of the inspectors, whom
Anthony returned to the registration office to console,
promising that she would personally bear whatever court
costs arose from the incident.9 Shortly afterward, a
Rochester newspaper ominously printed the Congressional
Enforcement Act, meant to strengthen the Fourteenth
Amendment. It provided that the crime of voting without
having the right to do so would subject violators to a fine of
no more than $500 and a prison term of not more than
three years.92
Notwithstanding the warning, on November 5th, 1872,
Anthony went to the polls and voted. Her act was the
88. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 62-63.
89. Inspector E.T. Marsh, statements made at Bergen, N.Y. (November 4,
1922), in BARRY, supra note 6, at 250. Anthony knew the danger she courted.
On the Saturday before election day, she had retained prominent attorney
Henry R. Selden, who advised her that both he and the Constitution supported
her desire to vote, and promised to "protect [Anthony] to the best of [his] ability"
from whatever legal trouble might result from her doing so. ADAMS, supra note
45, at 63-64. Selden, a former lieutenant governor, assemblyman, senator,
Court of Appeals judge, active abolitionist, and friend of Fredrick Douglass, was
a powerful voice on Anthony's behalf. See ALMA LUTZ, SUSAN B. ANTHONY.
REBEL, CRUSADER, HUMANITARIAN 200 (1959). Selden and his young co-counsel
John Van Voorhis would defend Anthony's case largely for free. Id. at 207.
90. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 63.
91. See ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 280; BARRY, supra note 6, at 250; infra
note 97 (describing the disposition of the inspectors' trials).
92. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 63. The women were charged under the
Section 19 of the Act of Congress of May 30th, 1870. Act of May 30th, 1870, ch.
114 § 19, 16 ST. 144-45 (1870). Anthony's two-count indictment charged her
with voting for each of two New York congressional representatives,
without having a lawful right to vote in said election district (the said
Susan B. Anthony being then and there a person of the female sex) as
[Anthony] well knew, contrary to the form of the statute of the United
States of America in such case made and provided, and against the
peace of the United States of America and their dignity.
United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 2-4.
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carefully considered execution of her plan to test the mettle
of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Susan's spirit and courage,
calling forth an element of recalcitrance in the old
Rochester background, rendered the act possible. It was an
example of great militancy carried out with complete
unconsciousness of its defiance and daring."93
Anthony's excitement over her ballot, the only one she
would ever cast in a national election, was tremendous. On
election day, she wrote to Elizabeth Cady Stanton:
Well, I have been & gone done it! Positively voted the Republican
ticket, straight, this A.M. at 7 o'clock; and swore my vote in at
that .... Fifteen women followed suit in this ward; all my three
sisters voted .... Hon. Henry R. Selden will be our Counsel. He
has read up on the law and all our arguments and is satisfied that
we are right-and ditto Judge Samuel Selden, his elder brother.
So we are in for a fine agitation in Rochester on the question.
9 4
On November 28th, Republican authorities, fearing
similar incidents if Anthony's act went unpunished, sent
deputy marshals to arrest Anthony and the fifteen other
women who had voted alongside her.96  The three
registration inspectors who had registered the women were
also arrested for their part, however unwitting, in the
scheme.9 ' On Thanksgiving Day, November 28, 1872, Susan
93. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 279.
94. See id. at 280-81.
95. Although the "Republican authorities" could clearly see the precedent
Anthony was attempting to set, they nevertheless must have been shocked at
how their legislation had worked to ensnare Anthony and her peers. See
KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 281; Van Voorhis, supra note 20. The
Congressional Act of 1870 under which Anthony was indicted had been crafted
to diminish the influence of Southern white supremacists who might attempt to
"stuff' ballot boxes in order to undermine the recent enfranchisement of male
Negro citizens. See Act of May 30th 1870, § 19. But "[ilnstead of a few miserable
Ku-Kluxers, [the Act] had caught a respectable group of Northern housewives,
voting the Republican ticket at that." KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at
281.
96. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 64.
97. The trial of the inspectors, also before Judge Hunt, followed immediately
after Anthony's. Although it attracted much less attention, it exemplified
usurpations of authority by local officials similar to those accompanying
Anthony's trial. Although their jury was permitted to render a verdict, it was
instructed to reach a verdict of guilty, which it did. Nine months later, two of
the three inspectors were jailed for not paying their fines, an act which Anthony
had counseled them not to do. President Grant granted a petition to remit their
fines, but during their one-week stay in jail, they were served the best of meals
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B. Anthony was ushered to her parlor to meet visitor Chief
Marshal Keeney, arrived with warrants to arrest her and
her sisters.98
Anthony's keen sense of drama and spectacle, and their
significance to political expression, is illustrated by the
circumstances of her arrest. Anthony insisted that she be
taken to the courthouse "by force," meaning that Keeney
would have to accompany her through the Rochester
streets.99 Anthony requested that she be handcuffed in
order to make her arrest more obvious to passerby, but
Keeney refused.0 0 When the two boarded a streetcar en
route to the commissioner's office, Anthony informed the
conductor: "I am traveling at the expense of the
government. This gentleman is escorting me to jail. Ask
him for my fare."''
Once Anthony and the women who had voted with her
had all been arrested and assembled in the courthouse,
they were made to wait for several hours before they were
told they would need to return the next morning. Ironically,
the women were held in the same office where, prior to the
Civil War, fugitive men and women had been examined
before they were returned to slavery.'°2 The following day,
Anthony's bail was set at five hundred dollars, (which she
refused to pay) and she was ordered to appear before the
Albany court in January.' 3
Immediately, Anthony resumed her schedule of
conferences and speaking tours, determined to publicize her
by the fifteen women who had voted with Anthony. "Hundreds of citizens called
to pay their respects, and the entire city regarded the proceedings as a joke."
CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 104-05. Anthony visited the men in jail,
commenting afterwards to a friend: "They are plucky." BARRY, supra note 6, at
267. Anthony netted $180 for a lecture she delivered following her trial, which
she divided among the inspectors in fulfillment of her promise. See KATHERINE
ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 300-01; supra note 91 and accompanying text.
98. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 64; KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at
282-83. Keeney must have thought the occasion one of singular significance;
Anthony would later note that Keeney wore his best, most "irreproachable
attire, nervously dangling in his gloved hands a well-brushed high hat" to bear
the news that "the commissioner wishes to arrest you." BARRY, supra note 6, at
251; see also ADAMS, supra note 45, at 64.
99. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 64.
100. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 251; ADAMS, supra note 45, at 64.
101. See LUTZ, supra note 89, at 201.
102. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 84, at 100.
103. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 283.
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position as much as possible before trial. 4
Her first act was to attend the annual National Woman
Suffrage Convention in Washington, D.C. on January 16th
and 17th, 1873, where she told hundreds of applauding
attendees:
The vaults in yonder Capitol hold the petitions of 100,000 women
for a declaratory act; and the calendars of our courts show that
women are already testing their right to vote under the
Fourteenth Amendment. I stand here under indictment for having
exercised my right as a citizen to vote at the last election, and by a
fiction of the law I am now in custody and not a free person. 15
Anthony then proceeded, as ordered, to Albany court
and petitioned United States District Judge N.K. Hall for a
writ of habeas corpus.06 The writ was denied and her bail
was increased to one thousand dollars, with orders for her
to appear at the May term in Rochester. Anthony had again
refused to make bail,0 7 but unknown to her, Selden paid it,
and thereby precluded the possibility of Anthony ever
appealing her case to a higher court."08 Although various
104. The respect shown to Anthony by some participants in the action
against her is an ironic mixture of period chivalry, likely combined with a fair
degree of awe and fear. As she departed for her first engagement, the National
Suffrage Convention, Anthony discovered Marshal Keeney waiting for her at
the railroad station. He admonished her not to leave Rochester pending trial, a
warning which Anthony ignored. This would become a predictable pattern;
every time Anthony left Rochester, Marshal Keeney would arrive to protest her
departure; every time Anthony would ignore the warning; every time Keeney
would let her go. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 65.
105. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 100-01.
106. See id. at 101.
107. See id.
108. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 65. Due to existing criminal procedure,
payment of Anthony's bail signified that she was not contesting the lawfulness
of her arrest, thus depriving her of support for the "unlawful detention" theory
under which she could have petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Nineteenth
century criminal procedure provided:
From the final decision of any court... inferior to the circuit court,
upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus or upon such writ when
issued, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court .... From the final
decision of such circuit court an appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court in the cases described in the last clause of the previous section
[which described cases where deprivation of liberty for violation of
United States law, or where a prisoner of foreign citizenship was
concerned] .... [The appeal] shall be taken on such terms, and under
such regulations and orders, as well for the custody and appearance of
the person alleged to be in prison, or confined, or restrained of his
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avenues to appeal were available, none but petition for a
writ of habeas corpus would have been both applicable to
Anthony and desirable from the point of view of her
lawyers. For example, although an appeal would have been
possible if a bench trial were conducted, Anthony's counsel,
aware of the sway (and necessity) of favorable public
opinion to win the case, must have viewed jury
participation as vital."9 When co-counsel John Van Voorhis
alerted Anthony as to the loss of her case's potential to
reach the Supreme Court, she attempted to have the bond
canceled, but found that it was impossible."0
Anthony returned to Rochester, and in the days
immediately preceding her trial, canvassed each of the
twenty-nine post office districts of Monroe County, making
speeches about the Fourteenth Amendment's application to
woman suffrage. Anthony's orations were treated by some
with a combination of amusement and contempt. The
Rochester Union and Advertiser published the following
editorial, headed, "Susan B. Anthony As a Corruptionist":
Miss Anthony is engaged in a work that will be likely to bring her
liberty, as for sending up to the appellate tribunal a transcript of the
petition, writ of habeas corpus, return thereto, and other proceedings,
as may be prescribed by the Supreme Court, or, in default thereof, by
the court of judge hearing the case.
ROBERT DESTY, MANUAL OF PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 124-
25, §§ 763-765 (1875) (explaining several pertinent rules of U.S. criminal
procedure). See also id. at 219 (discussing Surrender of Criminals By Their
Bail). If initial decisions were unfavorable, Anthony had hoped to bring the
issue before the Supreme Court. See KLEES, supra note 72, at 105. Absent a writ
of habeas corpus, Anthony had no viable means to appeal. The amount of the
controversy did not exceed two thousand dollars, which precluded judgment on
writ of error. See DESTY, supra note 108, at 93 (explaining 1 U.S. STAT. 84, 2
U.S. STAT. 244 and 5 U.S. STAT. 393). Although appeals to the Supreme Court
were permitted "in any case brought on account of the deprivation of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States,"
Anthony's case was brought against her for violation of a criminal law, and not
by herself, contesting constitutional deprivation of rights. Id. at 98 (explaining
13 U.S. STAT. 501). When Anthony reproached Selden for thus diminishing her
options in terms of an appeal, "he only replied mildly: 'I could not see a lady go
to jail.' "KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 283.
109. See DESTY, supra note 108, at 67, 98 (discussing appeals for cases tried
"without the intervention of a jury" under 13 U.S. STAT. 501).
110. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 252; CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 101.
Despite her frustration over Seldon's misguided chivalry in paying her bail,
after the case was concluded and Selden refused to send a bill, Anthony raised
the money from her supporters to repay him. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 252.
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to grief. It is nothing more nor less than an attempt to corrupt the
source of that justice under law which flows from trial by jury ....
United States courts are not stages for the enactment of comedy or
farce ....
Anthony's very crusade to educate the public was soon
used against her. As a Rochester newspaper suggested:
Miss Anthony undoubtedly believes that her doctrine must be
presented to the public personally; that, although the press and
the street corner discussion may be very useful as a means of
diffusing information, there is nothing like a good old stump
speech for impressing the people with the truth. For some time
past she has proceeded from place to place in the county of
Monroe, delivering addresses to crowded houses .... Can a jury be
found in this county who know nothing of the case, or who can give
it an impartial judgment? We think Miss Anthony has argued
herself away from home for trial, by her speeches throughout the
county.
112
District Attorney Richard Crowley, similarly alarmed
by the publicity Anthony was receiving, and on the grounds
that "no jury could be drawn which might not be prejudiced
in her favor," sought and won a change of venue to the
nearby county of Ontario."'
Non-plussed by the obstacle of a county to which her
cause was less familiar, Anthony continued to deliver her
speeches in twenty-one Ontario locations."4 Her friend
Matilda Joslyn Gage delivered a speech entitled "The
United States on Trial; not Susan B. Anthony" in sixteen
other locations throughout Ontario County.
"A FINE AGITATION" : ANTHONY'S CRIMINAL TRIAL
Anthony's trial was, in all respects, sensational, and
attracted nationwide comment from men and women,
suffragists and anti-suffragists alike. Skeptics of Anthony's
strategy of "voting as civil disobedience," including
111. See HARPER, supra note 21, at 436.
112. See MACLEAN SCRAPBOOK, supra note 20 (not paginated).
113. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 102.
114. See SCOTT & SCOTT, supra note 83, at 19; KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra
note 82, at 291. Anthony's reaction to the change of venue was immediate. Her
journal entry -for the day that the change of venue occurred reads: "Made
program to canvass County of Ontario and had bills printed." Id. at 292.
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Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who herself refused to attempt to
vote, scorned the idea of a formal trial, and believed that:
The insult of being tried by men-judges, jurors, lawyers, all
men-for violating the laws and constitution of men, made for the
subjugation of my whole sex; to be publicly impaled by the
unwavering finger of scorn, by party, press and pulpit, so far
transcends a petty verdict of butchers, cabdrivers and plowboys, in
a given case, that my continuous wrath against the whole dynasty
of tyrants in our political, religious, and social life has not left one
stagnant drop of blood in my veins to rouse for any single act of
insult.1
5
Notwithstanding such criticism, Anthony's trial was,
however corrupted by the anti-feminist legal system which
organized it, a golden opportunity for suffragists to present
their position in a court of law."6  The Fourteenth
Amendment's fitness as a tool for advancing the cause of
women's suffrage had not yet been tested,"7 and Anthony,
an experienced and learned woman with a reputation for
vigorous activism, was an exceptional representative of
what an intelligent, enfranchised woman would have to
offer-and what a formidable adversary she could be if she
were denied the vote."' United States v. Anthony was
115. Minow, supra note 24, at 734-35.
116. Judge Selden took note of the fact in his closing argument, stating that:
If the advocates of female suffirage had been allowed to choose the point
of attack to be made upon their position, they could not have chosen it
more favorably for themselves; and I am disposed to thank those who
have been instrumental in this proceeding, for presenting it in the form
of a criminal prosecution.
United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 17.
117. See id. at 19. The Supreme Court had already passed on the question in
the District of Columbia Cases. Two other important decisions occurred close in
time to Anthony's. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 93. The first was
Bradwell v. State, in which the Supreme Court had decided, shortly before
Anthony's trial, that a woman did not have a constitutional right to be granted
an attorney's license. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 130 (1872). See
generally Jane M. Friedman, Myra Bradwell: On Defying the Creator and
Becoming a Lawyer, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1287 (1993). Minor v. Happersett,
decided by the Supreme Court sixteen months after United States v. Anthony,
conclusively held that women had no right to vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 163 (1874). Although all
four cases were notable, and Anthony's was the only one not to reach the
Supreme Court, hers attracted the widest attention of all the cases. See CATr &
SHULER, supra note 84, at 93.
118. Selden warned the Court that:
Those engaged in the [suffrage] movement are able, sincere and
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argued at the Canandaigua Court House,"9 centered in
what is now the Western District of New York (and was
then the Northern District)2 ' on June 17th and 18th,
1873.21 As Anthony poetically described it, "[tihe lovely
village of Canandaigua, with its placid lake reflecting the
soft summer sky, gave no evidence of the great event that
was to make the day and the place memorable in history."
22
A large bell in the courthouse tower summoned all
interested parties to the courtroom, where a congregation of
prominent citizens soon assembled. 23 Attendees included
ex-President Fillmore, and Judge Nathan Hall, who had
refused the writ of habeas corpus, and would have tried the
'24
case itself, but refused to do so for undisclosed reasons.
Although keenly aware of the legal barriers before her,
Anthony had hoped in her trial "for a broad and liberal
interpretation of the Constitution and its recent
amendments... justice.., a trial by a jury."25 Much to her
dismay, Anthony's greatest obstacle at trial would not be
adverse case law, the opposing attorney's arguments, the
Fourteenth Amendment's interpretation, or the sway of
public opinion. Rather, she would come up against the
monstrous tide of an "age-long trap for woman's suffrage,"
American politics. 26 The presiding justice, one Anthony
believed she outclassed in constitutional knowledge, was J.
Ward Hunt, described by Anthony in her diary as a "small-
earnest women, and they will not be silenced .... They believe, with
an intensity of feeling which men who have not associated with them
have not yet learned, that their sex had not had, and has not now, its
just and true position in the organization of government and society.
United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 19.
119. The Court House now serves as the Ontario County Court House,
where a handsome bust of Susan B. Anthony guards the doors to her onetime
courtroom. Anthony's portrait hangs inside the courtroom, with the portraits of
other prominent Rochester area residents. See DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester,
N.Y.), May 25, 1984, in SCRAPBOOKI SUSAN B. ANTHONY CLIPPINGS, Vol. H,
Rochester Public Library, Local History Division, Rochester, N.Y. (1986).
120. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.Y. 1873).
121. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 5.
122. See 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 647 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton &
Susan B. Anthony eds., 1889) [hereinafter Stanton & Anthony].
123. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 292-93.
124. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 101, 102; KATHERINE ANTHONY,
supra note 82, at 293.
125. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 84.
126. ADAMS, supra note 45, at 163 (quoting Carrie Chapman Catt).
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brained, prim-looking man."'27 Anthony's was his first case
since his appointment, a promotion attributed to the
influence of New York Senator and Republican party leader
Roscoe Conkling.28 Hunt's appointment to the Anthony case
was merely "the first step in the preparations that had gone
on behind the scenes" to frustrate the outcome."9 The depth
of Conkling's anti-woman-suffrage influence on the case
would give rise to a hotly-debated set of extraordinaryjudicial orders by Hunt.3 °
"THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GovERNS": THE ARGUMENTS
The prosecution's approach in United States v. Anthony
was a simple one: aware of the hazards posed by a
potentially sympathetic jury, District Attorney Crowley
sought to frame the issue as a foregone conclusion, and to
suggest that if, indeed, a question required resolution in
trial, it was one of law rather than fact. Crowley's hope of a
favorable judicial charge to the jury was evident in his
opening statement:
when all of the evidence is out.., it will be for you to decide under
the charge of his honor, the Judge whether or not the defendant
[voted] .... [The Government] think[s] that there is no question
about it either one way or the other, neither a question of fact, nor
a question of law...
Despite some public criticism of Anthony's addresses,
Judge Selden's argument on her behalf borrowed liberally
from her writings and speeches." 2 Thus, although the
127. Id. at 66.
128. See id.; LUTZ, supra note 89, at 209.
129. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 293.
130. See HARPER, supra note 21, at 441; see also RHETA CLDE DORR, SUSAN
B. ANTHONY: THE WOMAN WHO CHANGED THE MIND OF A NATION 257-59 (1970);
KLEES, supra note 72, at 107. Conkling, who would attempt to use the
Fourteenth Amendment to declare corporations "persons" for its purposes,
thereby protecting the interests of railroad corporations who wished to set fees,
was one personification of the increasing corruption of the Republican party
politics at the time. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 266.
131. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 6.
132. Selden made no secret of his admiration for Anthony's arguments.
After observing Anthony's address on women's right to vote, delivered to the
New York State commission for revising the Constitution, Selden told Anthony,
"If I had heard this address first I could have made a far better argument before
Judge Hall [supporting the habeas corpus motion.]" HARPER, supra note 21, at
2000] 1013
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prosecution suggested, and Judge Hunt early ruled, that
Anthony, as a woman,3 3 was incompetent to speak on her
own behalf 34 her ideas, counter-arguments and legal
interpretations were expressed through her counsel. 36
Anthony evidently approved of Selden's intense three-hour
argument, noting in her diary that his was "a masterly
statement of the case.",
3 6
Anthony's defense articulated four reasons why woman
suffrage was Constitutionally mandated and logically
necessary to democracy, and raised as a defense Anthony's
conviction that she was merely performing her civic duty by
voting. Each of the arguments adds color to Anthony's
carefully-constructed picture of how American government,
and the face of Reconstruction, would appear if universal
suffrage were achieved.
I. Completion of Democracy
Selden's arguments in Anthony's defense opened with
an appeal to the Constitution's stated purpose, as a
guarantee of the inalienable rights of citizens. As Anthony
had argued throughout the county, 'hen... people enter
into a free government, they do not barter away their
natural rights; they simply pledge themselves to protect
each other in the enjoyment of them .. surely the right of
the whole people to vote is [one of those rights]. "07
With liberal reference to the theories of Locke,
Blackstone, and Godwin, Selden urged that, as
"governments derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed," women, as part of the governed, are thereby
entitled to participate in granting power to the
433.
133. After facetious prompting from the prosecution, the defense early
agreed that Anthony was, in fact, a woman. See United States v. Anthony
transcript, supra note 20, at 7. When asked for the concession outright, Selden
was reported to have replied, "Yes, now and ever, heart and soul, a woman."
KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 296.
134. "The law has... categorically excluded the speech of women from legal
rituals." Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 11 (1990).
135. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 14.
Unfortunately, whatever "off-the-record" arguments might have been made in
connection with this ruling are not a part of the historical record.
136. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 294.
137. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 152.
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government.'38 Thus, because women are citizens, having
the same interest that men have in the establishment and
maintenance of good government... to the same extent as men
bound to obey the laws; [and suffering] to the same extent by bad
laws, and profit[ing] to the same extent by good laws ... upon
principles of equal justice, [women, by voting,] should be allowed
equally with men, to express their preference in the choice of law-
makers and rulers.
139
This fundamental suffragist argument suggests that
woman suffrage is not only mandated by democracy, but
achieves one of democracy's foremost goals: the
establishment of stability by "depriv[ing] the mass of the
people of all motive for revolution .... [A]n aristocracy of
sex has not proved an exception to the rule [that less-than-
full extension of suffrage renders government insecure]. " 14°
In fact, revolts against government taxation had already
been orchestrated and undertaken by small groups of
138. Id. at 20 (quoting the Declaration of Independence).
139. Id. at 17-18.
140. Id. at 21. Abigail Adams was the first American woman who
threatened such a female revolt, warning her husband John in March of 1776 to
"remember the ladies, and be more generous and favorable to them than your
ancestors," since "all men would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and
attention are not paid to the ladies, we are determined to foment a rebellion,
and will not hold ourselves bound to obey any laws in which we have no voice or
representation." Her husband John's response was an amused dismissal which
predicted the nineteenth century republican woman's sphere of home influence,
and helped to inflict a Constitutional silence which would take almost a
century-and-a-half to fill:
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh .... [Y]our
Letter was the first Intimation that another Tribe more numerous and
powerfull [sic] than all the rest were grown discontented .... We know
better than to repeal our Masculine systems.., and rather than give
[them up], which would compleatly [sic] subject Us to the Despotism of
the Peticoat, I hope General Washington, and all our brave Heroes
would fight.
MARi Jo & PAUL BUHLE, THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 58
(1978); HOFF, supra note 4, at 60, 62. In a resonating reflection of what
goals the women's rights movement would adopt decades later, Abigail
curtly replied:
I can not say that I think you very generous to the Ladies... and
notwithstanding all your wise Laws and Maxims we [women] have it in
our power not only to free ourselves but to subdue our Masters, and
without voilence [sic] throw both your natural and legal authority at
our feet ....
Id.; HOFF, supra note 4, at 60, 62.
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women, a fact which Anthony had been careful to point out
in her pre-trial speeches." According to Anthony's defense,
woman suffrage "furnishes the greatest security for free
government," and is therefore mandated by the spirit of the
Constitution to substantiate and strengthen America's
claim to democracy.
4 1
141. Anthony noted in her Ontario County addresses that "all over the
country, women property holders are waking up to the injustice of taxation
without representation, and ere long will refuse, en masse, to submit to the
imposition. There is no she, or her, or hers, in tax laws." United States v.
Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 161. Although not widely prevalent, the
movement was popular enough to generate the formation of women taxpayers
associations and anti-tax leagues in cities nationwide. See Jones, supra note 9,
at 265, 267-68. A few weeks before Anthony's trial, the Women Tax Payers
Association of the City of Rochester and County of Monroe met to reiterate the
following protest:
To the Board of Supervisors of the County of Monroe, and to the Hon.
the Common Council of the City of Rochester: The payment of taxes is
exacted in direct violation of the principles that "Governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that "there
shall be no taxation without representation." Therefore we earnestly
protest against the payment of taxes, either Municipal, County, or
State, until the ballot secures us in the right of representation, just and
equal with other citizens.
United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 182-83 (speech of Matilda
Joslyn Gage). After Anthony's trial, the Association would adopt resolutions
condemning the verdict as the fruit of a tyrannical bench, and Judge Hunt for
"high crimes and misdemeanors." MACLEAN SCRAPBOOK, supra note 20, (not
paginated).
Although some tax-resisting women escaped penalty, many lost their homes
and personal property to foreclosure and sale. See United States v. Anthony
transcript, supra note 20, at 160-61 (listing tax-resisting women not penalized
for their refusal to pay taxes); Jones, supra note 9, at 268-69 (stating that many
women did lose their property for refusing to pay taxes).
142. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 21; see also
NORTON, supra note 8, at 50. Anthony's argument for universal suffrage was
specific to women by virtue of her indictment, which charged that she voted
"without having a lawful right to vote in said election district (the said Susan B.
Anthony being then and there a person of the female sex)" United States v.
Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 3. Anthony predicted that 'The
indictment presented against [me] will be regarded by the future historian as a
remarkable document to have originated in a republic against on of its native-
born citizens guilty of no crime." STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 122, at 647-
48.
The argument that voting was a basic right of citizenship had long been
employed in the fight to give the vote to other traditionally disenfranchised
groups: religious minorities, non-property-holders, servants, and immigrants.
See generally ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAL AMERICA: A STuDY OF
ELECTIONS IN THE THIRTEEN COLONIES, 1689-1776, at 28-48 (1977); ROBERT J.
DiNKIN, VOTING IN REvLUTIONARY AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE
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Selden noted in conclusion that there exists "no ground
consistent with the principle on which the franchise has
been given to all men, upon which it can be denied to
women," 4 3 a point echoed decades later by suffragist Carrie
Chapman Catt in support of the Nineteenth Amendment:
Government by "the people" is expedient or it is not. If it is
expedient, then obviously all the people must be included. If it is
not expedient, the simplest logic leads to the conclusion that the
classes to be deprived of the franchise should be determined by
their qualities of unfitness for the vote. If education, intelligence,
grasps of public questions, patriotism, willingness and ability to
give public service, respect of the law, are selected as fair
qualifications for those to be entrusted with the vote.., it follows
that men and women will be included...144
This, Anthony's premier point, is consistent with her
prediction that extension of the franchise to women would
achieve the completion of true democracy in America,
precluding the need for further "rebellion" by women. 14 The
ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, at 27-43 (1982).
143. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 22. Of course,
such an interpretation depends upon the assumption that the grounds upon
which the franchise was given to men by the Constitution's authors were
related to the democratic ideal of representation, and not to the masculine
nature of the parties involved. Indeed, votership in Anthony's time was often
considered dependent on a characteristically masculine physiology:
Woman is not qualified for the ballot or likely to be benefited by its
exercise for physical and physiological reasons .... Physically, women
are not fitted for the task of protecting and upholding any form of
government .... Woman must therefore recognize the natural
limitations upon her strength and fitness to discharge the duties of
citizenship .... [Assertion of power must, in every respect, be
disadvantageous to women, since they are certainly not so well
qualified to carry on the machinery of politics and the administration
of Government as are men, by reason of their nature, education and
experience.
Paper presented by J. Newton Fiero at an Anti-Suffrage Meeting (May 11,
1894), in PAMPHLETS PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED BY TIE WOMEN'S ANTI-
SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION, supra note 10, at 2-4.
144. CARRIE CHAMPAN CATT, WoMAN SUFFRAGE BY FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 88 (1917).
145. BUBLE & BUHLE, supra note 140, at 58 (quoting Abigail Adams' letter
to John Adams). Anthony's position that woman voters would be a stabilizing
element was crucial, as female suffrage has historically been "equated with
social discord." Avery & Konefsky, supra note 16, at 334. As Simon Greenleaf
argued:
Amid the storms which beat without, in the political world, the
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effects of disenfranchisement, of course, were twofold: the
status of women was thereby limited both politically and
socially, and since men appeared reluctant to shift public
opinion in favor of womankind, the power of the law was
needed to force the change.
II. The Protection of Women
Secondly, the defense argued that the vote was
necessary for women to protect their personal, physical, and
financial well-being, 146 despite advances made since New
York's adoption of the Married Women's Property Act of
1848.14' However, as Selden pointed out, those very
revisions were brought about by the lobbying efforts of a
small group of women, strengthening the suggestion that
men were not adequate protectors of women's interests.'
domestic hearth is yet the sanctuary of repose, and the domestic altar
still receives the offering of united hearts, to the God of peace and love.
But if, in addition to all our other sources of party strife, as if the
thousand existing elements of contention could not suffice, we were to
array male and female electors with their candidates in opposition, it is
easier to imagine the uproar that would ensue, than to foretell when or
how it would end.
Id.
146. Examples of the hardships endured by wives under the common law
abound. A Pennsylvania grandmother wrote the following to her Maryland
granddaughter, considering a potential property sale to settle the debts of the
girl's recalcitrant husband, for which her permission was required: "[Niever
give your consent .... I allow that it seems hard that a wife should deny to pay
her husband's debts, but they are not just debts. How many wives are now
suffering the utmost misery by complying with the wishes of such a husbandl"
NORTON, supra note 8, at 46.
147. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 25-26.
148. See id. at 26-27. The theme that women must take charge of reform
efforts on their own behalf was echoed throughout the battle for woman
suffrage. During debates over the Fourteenth Amendment proposal among
abolitionists and suffragists, Anthony had been made sharply aware that the
woman suffrage movement could only depend upon the efforts of women
themselves. When women demanded that the word "male" be struck from the
proposed Amendment, they were stunned to find that their male peers, while
grateful for their efforts, supported the Amendment as written. Although most
present agreed that woman suffrage was a just and logical Reconstruction
demand, the men asserted that the American people could not accept tvo
reforms at once, and urged the women to postpone their appeals: 'This is the
Negro's hour." CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 47; BARRY, supra note 6, at
173-94; STANTON & ANTHONY, supra note 122, at 400. Anthony viewed these
words as a betrayal, and thereafter, placed no faith in "masculine good will,"
depending almost exclusively on a select group of dedicated women as her
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His argument suggested what Anthony had been urging for
years, that if men "fail to represent [women's] true
sentiments, [the women must] send up, from every nook &
corner of the State one united resolve to refuse to trust
them as our agents."
Concluding on a more global note, Selden provided a
brief history of what injustices governments headed
exclusively by men have inflicted upon women, referring
broadly to the practices of Chinese, Hindu, Jewish, Islamic,
and British cultures and laws, 50 and finding that:
The principle which governs in these cases, or which has done so
hitherto, has been at all times and everywhere the same. Those
who succeed in obtaining power, no matter by what means, will,
with rare exceptions, use it for their exclusive benefit .... The
condition of subjection in which women have been held is the
result of this principle; the result of superior strength, not of
superior rights, on the part of men.'
5
'
As Anthony had stated in a speech she delivered
repeatedly from the late 1860s into the 1890s:
I suppose [men] will guard their own wives and daughters and
mothers and sisters, but is every man as careful to guard another
man's wife, daughter, mother and sister? It is not a question of
safety to women in general. It is simply "Is she my property?"....
You women who have kind brothers and husband and sons, I ask
you to 4oin with us in this movement so that woman can protect
herself.
52
allies. ADAlls, supra note 45, at 44-45; HARPER, supra note 18, at 28. The
attitude that American women had sacrificed more than any group of men for
the womens vote, and indeed, more than any group of men had sacrificed for the
male vote, was to dominate the women's rights movement into the next century.
Carrie Chapman Catt, leader of the final generation of suffragettes, would note
in 1917:
For two generations groups of women have given their lives and their
fortunes to secure the vote for themselves and hundreds of thousands
of women are giving all the time at their command. No class of men in
our own or any other country has made one-tenth the effort nor
sacrificed one-tenth as much for the vote.
CATr, supra note 144, at 70.
149. Susan B. Anthony, Address at Batavia, New York (May 1852),
reprinted in BARRY, supra note 6, at 70.
150. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 28.
151. Id. at 28-29.
152. READER, supra note 6, at 139, 145 (second emphasis added).
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Enfranchised women, Selden argued, would be in a
position to correct the injustices inflicted upon them by the
American systems of politics and justice.5 ' This, the second
of Anthony's predicted ramifications of woman suffrage,
was discussed with frenzied condemnation by dissenters of
the women's movement, and strategically underplayed by
its proponents. History has long suggested that changes in
legal forms can signal great changes in society. The
enfranchisement of women, as Anthony well knew, would
open the doors, not only to women as voters, but to women
as lawyers, jurists, judges, and legislators. Just as
enfranchisement would shut the doors to a "female
revolution," the doors would be opened for women to make
powerful changes within the system: acts such as Anthony's
courageous vote would pass from the realm of revolution to
that of benign civic duty. It was, perhaps, this outcome
which was most feared by Anthony's opponents: once
women were allowed to cast their ballots, they would
inevitably and irreversibly change the climate of the
political system by infiltrating it with some of "their own."
III: Improving the Political Process
Selden's third point argued against the objectors'
contention that the franchise will change women, asserting
that, to the contrary, women will change the outcomes of
voting for the betterment of both sexes, meanwhile
retaining those character traits considered essential to
153. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 29.
Ironically, the case of United States v. Anthony, itself, would be critically hailed
as yet another injustice against a woman. See HARPER, supra note 21, at 441.
Anthony would begin to list the trial's improprieties at her sentencing:
Miss Anthony: ... [Y]ou have trampled under foot every vital principle
of our government. My natural rights, my civil rights, my political
rights, my judicial rights, are all alike ignored... my right to a trial by
a jury of my peers as an offender against law .... May it please the
Court to remember that since the day of my arrest last November, this
is the first time that either myself or any person of my disfranchised
class has been allowed a word of defense before judge or jury -
Judge Hunt: The prisoner must sit down-the Court cannot allow it.
United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 82.
This exchange is now recognized as representative of the way women were, and
continue to be, treated in a male-dominated system of jurisprudence. See
generally Nikolaus Benke, Women in the Courts: An Old Thorn in Men's Sides, 3
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 195 (1995).
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ante-bellum femininity.'54 Anthony thus presented in its
fledgling stages an argument which would become central
to the women's movement in the next century: that women,
voting through their God-given nature, would inevitably
improve the political process with their input.'55
Anthony expanded upon her second rationale for the
vote with an attempt to answer her detractors' fears about
what women would "do" with the vote by suggesting that
women's effect on politics could be nothing but positive. In
doing so, she deftly rebounded to her opponents their own
characterization of the feminine nature. Instead of women's
delicacy and moral uprightness as unfitting her for the
ballot, Anthony argued that such purity and righteousness
would instead make women the perfect citizens: able to
make wise and fitting decisions which could only benefit the
government.
In light of this characterization of women as potential
political participants both capable and feminine, the
defense rendered commentary on the then-recent case of
Bradwell v. State. Myra Bradwell, a trained attorney, had
been denied a license to practice law by the Illinois
Supreme Court, and sued the state, claiming her right to
practice law.5 ' The Supreme Court of the United States
154. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 29-31.
155. See id. at 29-30. Anthony's defense here incorporated one of the anti-
suffragettes' chief arguments: that women's nature was separate and distinct
from that of men's; more pure, delicate, and inherently moral. Anthony and her
compatriots adopted this assumption and turned it against their proponents to
argue that women's nature, thus described, could only benefit the political
process. As minister Olympia Brown argued: "The voting of women will change
the ideals of our statesmanship, substituting humanitarianism for purely
financial considerations, bringing to the front the ideals presented by the
Master." GREENE, supra note 32, at 142. Arguing the point in a secular context,
Carrie Chapman Catt would later assert:
Woman suffrage will increase the proportion of intelligent voters
[because high schools contain more girls, and a higher proportion of
women than men are literate], moral [voters, because only 5% of]
criminals are women... native born voters... [and would] help to
correct election procedure [because woman suffrage states located the
polls in "respectable places."]
See CATr, supra note 144, at 89-90.
This aspect of Selden's argument for Anthony is troublesome, because it
necessarily affirms the nineteenth century female stereotype of women as the
guardians of morality, thereby weakening the point which follows: that women's
capability and right to vote (contradictions to the stereotype) should naturally
extend to positions and occupations of greater power and responsibility.
156. The Bradwell case had been observed closely by Susan B. Anthony,
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upheld the denial, on the grounds that Bradwell was a
married woman.'57
Selden rejected the Bradwell Court's position that:
[Tihe right of females to pursue any lawful employment for a
livelihood ... assumes that it is one of the privileges and
immunities of women as citizens... [which] certainly cannot be
affirmed.... The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.
15
Instead, Selden asserted:
To aid in removing as far as possible the disheartening difficulties
which women dependent upon their own exertions encounter, it is,
I think, desirable that such official positions as they can fill should
be thrown open to them, and that they should be given the same
power that men have to aid each other by their votes .... To deny
them such rights, is to leave them in a condition of political
servitude as absolute as that of the African slaves before their
emancipation.
159
who took advantage of the opportunity to publicize the case wherever possible.
She wrote to Bradwell shortly after the Supreme Court decision:
My dear Mrs. Bradwell:
Like the Frenchman who didn't swear on a certain occasion-so I
don't-simply because no swearing could possibly reach the case. I am
fired to White heat. Do send me all you say in the [Chicago Legal]
News on the decision and do put all your lawyer's brain to it. Write me
the best letter you possibly can for me to read at our... May meeting
in New York. Don't fail-I pray you .... Our convention will pour hot
shot into that old Court.
Friedman, supra note 117, at 1300.
157. See United States v. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (1872). The Court further
reasoned that endorsers of the statute authorizing lawyer licenses could not
have contemplated its potential application to women when it was passed: "It is
to be remembered... [t]hat God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres
of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was
regarded as an almost axiomatic truth." Id. at 132. The Court was careful,
however, to distance itself, formally, if not logically, from the suffrage issue,
stating that "[tihe question does not involve the right of a female to vote." Id. at
133.
158. Id. at 140-41. Judge Hunt would use the Bradwell ruling to bolster his
decision, reasoning that, just as the privilege of practicing law was not
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, voting was also neither a privilege
nor immunity of citizens. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note
20, at 64.
159. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 30-31.
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Selden's expansion of Anthony's point to its logical
conclusion was a leap that Anthony herself did not often
take in her speeches. His extension of "how women can
change voting for the better" to admit openly that woman
suffrage could increase other opportunities for women as
career public servants was indeed venturesome, calling to
attention one of the movement's most revolutionary ideas:
the concept of women "taking over" traditionally male
positions. While imitative of Anthony's fearlessness when
arguing a cause, Seldon's assertion that suffrage would
change, not only the political world, but also alter the job
market, might have called an unpleasant effect of suffrage
to the attention of an already hostile Court. Still, the point
accurately predicted what would become a central issue in
the fight for women's rights following woman suffrage: the
slow spread of women's liberation from the voting booth to
the highest positions of influence.
IV: Fourteenth Amendment Mandate
Selden concluded with a return to constitutional law,
asserting that voting was indeed a "privilege and
immunity" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 ° as
the term "citizen" has historically implied a voice and a vote
in government, without which one is not a citizen, but a
subject. 6' The disenfranchised, then, enjoy a legal status in
many ways comparable to that of a slave.
160. It is surprising to note that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional
arguments received less attention in Selden's defense arguments than his more
pragmatic (and less "legal") ones. Although curious, the explanation for this
anomaly is that, while the equal protection clause is now considered "the
keystone of judicial decisions" on civil rights and voting issues, its scope in the
nineteenth century was virtually unexplored, leaving Selden to rely on more
"familiar territory." See Jan Barber, Would Susan B. Anthony Go Free Today?,
TIMES-UNION (Rochester, N.Y.), June 18, 1973, evening edition, at B1; Speech of
John Van Voorhis, supra note 20, at 5-6. Ironically, the Supreme Court's first
brush with the Amendment's application to women in Minor v. Happersett did
not observe the invocation of equal protection arguments at all. See generally
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
161. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 36-37.
162. Id. at 31-32. The "slave analogy" also appears in earlier Colonial
writings. Unhappy eighteenth-century wives commonly compared their status
to that of slaves, highlighting their feeling that escape was impossible. See
NORTON, supra note 8, at 48-50. It is surprising that Selden did not, as Anthony
had in her speeches prior to trial, advance the conclusion that the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against denial of voting rights based on "previous
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The suggestion that voting is a "privilege and
immunity" of citizenship anticipated a broadening of the
franchise, not only to women, but to all citizens of the
United States. Anthony was advancing the idea that
limitations on the franchise, regardless of whether the basis
was gender, property, religion, or immigrant status, (all
bases by which the franchise was then limited) was in
direct conflict with the spirit and words of the Constitution.
The precedent Anthony wished to set, and the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment she
championed, would result in universal enfranchisement for
all citizens.
After summarizing his arguments, Selden concluded
that, even if Anthony's vote were illegal, her good-faith
belief, reasonable under the arguments hitherto presented,
that her vote was legal, excused her from penalty."63 Despite
some New York cases to the contrary, Selden warned the
court that for Anthony to be convicted for completing an act
which her own lawyer had characterized as lawful, would
be a "judicial fiction." "
Although the trial transcript does not include the
prosecution's arguments, Anthony later summarized them
as follows:
District Attorney Crowley followed Judge Selden with an
argument two hours in length. He stated that, in his view, the case
simply presented questions of law, and that his argument,
therefore, would be addressed strictly to the court, leaving the
condition of servitude" effectively applied to woman's political position. Anthony
and other suffragettes had long argued that a woman's marital status, in which
she relinquished control and custody of her person, constituted a position of
servitude: "I submit that the deprivation by law of the ownership of one's
person, wages, property, children, the denial of the right as an individual, to sue
and be sued, and to testify in the courts, is ... a condition of servitude most
bitter and absolute .... " United States v. Anthony transcript (Anthony speech),
supra note 20, at 171-72, 173. See generally Avery & Konefsky, supra note 16,
at 324-25 (describing how the Grimke sisters' made "explicit links between
slavery and the status of women" in their 1837-38 abolitionist lectures).
163. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 51-56. This
type of defense has received increased attention in recent years, and some
commentators suggest that the criminal law should be amended to consider
"motive testimony" as evidence. Furthermore, some argue that juries should be
given the right to acquit those who satisfy the elements of the act, but who are
able to prove through motive testimony that their criminal act is justified as
civil disobedience. See Loesch, supra note 24, at 1101-19.
164. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 58.
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court to give such instructions to the jury upon the facts as he
might deem proper. He contended that the right to vote was not
included in 'privileges and immunities,' and was only given by
State laws and State constitutions. He concluded his argument by
saying that an honest mistake of the facts may sometimes excuse,
but a mistake of law never.
165
Thus summarized, Crowley's argument furnished a
clear cue to Hunt: an invitation to sweep the case away
from the jury's purview, and settle the matter once and for
all with the dictates of an adverse bench.
"THE GREATEST JUDICIAL OUTRAGE": HUNT'S RULING
While Anthony had hoped for a fair trial of her
arguments in court, what she received was a rude
introduction into the politics of the day. The proceedings in
which she was embroiled "leaned more heavily on politics
than on legal niceties meant to safeguard the accused."66
Judge Hunt, careful to comply with the wishes of his
benefactor, Conkling, and "eager to prove his skill, issued a
series of rulings so extraordinary that they infuriated
Susan's lawyer and disheartened the prosecutor."'67
At the conclusion of Crowley's argument, and without
retiring to consider the case, Judge Hunt drew a prepared
document from his pocket and read it aloud as his charge to
the jury. 8 In it, Hunt agreed with Crowley that the case
involved a single question of law,'69 thereby leaving no
questions for the jury." Hunt's published decision defined
the legal question as he viewed it:
The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege
arising under the constitution of the state, and not under the
Constitution of the United States. The qualifications are different
in the different states .... Miss Anthony knew that she was a
woman and that the constitution of this state prohibits her from
voting.
165. Stanton & Anthony, supra note 122, at 675.
166. ADAMS, supra note 45, at 66.
167. See id. at 66-67.
168. See id. at 67.
169. See id.
170. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 71-73.
171. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 830-31 (N.D.N.Y. 1873)
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Over the vehement protestations of Selden, Hunt
instructed the jury to find a verdict of guilty, ordered the
clerk to enter it, and dismissed the jury without polling its
members.' 2 Anthony's sensational trial thus ended in a
crushing anti-climax. Anthony described the ordeal thus in
her journal: "The greatest judicial outrage history ever
recorded! No law, logic or demand of justice could change
Judge Hunt's will. We were convicted before we had a
hearing and the trial was a mere farce."'
Anthony was far from alone in her opinion concerning
Judge Hunt's handling of the case, which remains the only
criminal case on record where a defendant entitled to a jury
trial requiring a finding of intent, was convicted by an
ordered verdict of guilty without jury participation.' The
Canandaigua Times fumed:
The decisions of Judge Hunt in the Anthony case have been widely
criticized, and it seems to us not without reason. Even among
those who accept the conclusion that women have not a legal right
(No. 14,459). Whether the vote was generally a right of federal citizenship, or
whether only votes for federal officers were, had been debated since the
Thirteenth Amendment was proposed. The Republican framers of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 had identified the right to vote in state and local elections,
and to hold state and local offices, as state-conferred (and therefore, beyond the
purview of federal regulation and interference). See Kaczorowski, supra note 59,
at 570-71. One might presume, then, that Anthony was indicted for those of her
votes that had been traditionally recognized as state-regulated: those for
Congressional Representatives from New York State, but not for her vote for
President. This distinction, however, had been blurred by the Supreme Court's
decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases, and although suggested by the wording
of the indictment, did not arise during the trial. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872) (holding that the natural rights of citizenship were
incident to state citizenship, and rejecting the Congressional theory of United
States citizenship and congressionally-enforceable rights). The Slaughterhouse
Cases decision fundamentally limited (and largely invalidated) the Fourteenth
Amendment's "privileges and immunities" clause. See also United States. v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 553 (1875).
172. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 67-68, 71-73.
The hapless jury members, although witnesses to a historic and unprecedented
case, did not deliberate, nor did any utter a word or form a gesture throughout
the courtroom proceedings. Their presence, in Judge Hunt's words, was
relegated to the act of "hearken[ing] to [their] verdict as the Court ha[d]
recorded it," and no demonstration of their assent or dissent was requested or
allowed. Id.; see also CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 103 (describing how, in
the midst of the controversy over whether the jury should be polled, Hunt
discharged it).
173. HARPER, supra note 21, at 441.
174. See John Van Voorhis Speech, supra note 20, at 8.
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to vote... we find many seriously questioning the propriety of a
proceeding whereby the proper functions of the jury are dispensed
with, and the Court arrogates to itself the right to determine as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused party.
The New York Sun echoed: "It is hardly worth while to
argue that the right of trial by jury includes the right to a
verdict by the jury, and to a free and impartial verdict, not
one ordered, compelled and forced from them by an adverse
and predetermined court."'76
Although Judge Hunt may have wished to dispose of
Anthony quickly, the issue would not be dismissed
quietly, 77 nor would Hunt escape venomous personal
attacks from all sides. The Rochester Democrat and
Chronicle went so far as to call for Hunt's removal from the
bench:
In the action of Judge Hunt there was a grand, over-reaching
assumption of authority, unsupported by any point in the case
itself, but adopted as an established legal principle. If there is such
a principle, Judge Hunt did his duty beyond question, and he is
scarcely lower than the angels so far as personal power goes ....
The American people will not tolerate a judge like this on the
bench of their highest court. To do it would be to submit their
necks to as detestable a tyranny as ever existed on the face of the
earth. They will not sit quietly to see their liberties, red and
radiant with the blood of a million of their sons, silently melted
away in the judicial crucible of a stolid and tyrannical judge of
their Federal Court.
178
Hunt's order was an irregular twist on the more
established principle that courts possessed the power to
direct verdicts of acquittal for criminal defendants. 79 While
this power was exercised in the nineteenth century as an
outgrowth of directed verdicts in civil matters, and the
judge's power to set aside a jury verdict of guilty, the power
to direct a verdict of guilty had not been explored in
practice or in theory, and Hunt's actions proved an ignored
175. HARPER, supra note 21, at 441-42.
176. Id. at 442.
177. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 67.
178. HARPER, supra note 21, at 442-43.
179. See Richard Sauber & Michael Waldman, Unlimited Power: Rule 29(A)
and the Unreviewability of Directed Judgments of Acquittal, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
433, 439 (1994).
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exception, rather than a disturbing alteration, to the
general rule.
Anthony was likely correct in her personal belief that
Judge Hunt's irregular order to the jury was the direct
result of political favor-trading. She suspected that the jury
instructions delivered by Hunt had been inspired, and
perhaps written, by Conkling."' Twenty-four years later,
Anthony's co-counsel, Van Voorhis, said of the trial: "There
was a pre-arranged determination to convict her. A jury
trial was dangerous, and so the Constitution was openly
and deliberately violated."'
Jury participation would indeed have been dangerous.
After their discharge, the outraged jurymen of United
States v. Anthony talked freely about their experience, and
many declared that, had the question been given to them,
they would not have found Anthony guilty.'82
Selden would protest the constitutional violations in a
motion for a new trial the day after United States v.
Anthony concluded." Selden asserted that Hunt's refusal to
submit a criminal case to the jury amounted to a denial of
Anthony's right to trial by jury."84 Additionally, Selden
articulated the question of fact which would otherwise have
removed the decision from the Judge's concept of the law,
and placed it in the hands of the jury: whether Anthony's
actions were square with the "essence of the offense," which
required that she "knowingly" vote, with the knowledge
that she had no right to do so.' Given Selden's advice to
Anthony, prior to her voting, and the registration officer's
180. See BARRY, supra note 6, at 266; HARPER, supra note 21, at 441. Years
later, Anthony would note in her memoirs that Hunt and Conkling had met in
chambers just before her trial. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 84, at 294.
181. HARPER, supra note 21, at 444.
182. Id. at 439; CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 103.
183. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 68.
184. See id. at 73.
185. See id. at 69, 77-78. While Anthony was not allowed to testify on her
behalf, Judge Hunt allowed notes of Anthony's testimony at a pretrial
Commissioner's examination to be read at trial. Although the prosecution
attempted to use Anthony's statement that "I should have made the same
endeavor to vote that I did had I not consulted Judge Selden" to prove that she
voted intentionally, co-counsel for Anthony Van Voorhis revealed on cross-
examination that Anthony had also said that she "had no doubt of her right to
vote." Id. at 16. This was the only evidence of Anthony's knowledge that her
vote was illegal that was presented at trial, and thus Hunt's conclusion that no
question of fact remained for the jury is very tenuous indeed. See id.
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allowing her to vote, it would have been possible for a
reasonable jury to find that Anthony believed that she had
a right to vote.86
After hearing from the district attorney, Judge Hunt
summarily denied the motion.'87
"THIS, SO-CALLED, FORM OF GOVERNMENT": THE
SENTENCING OF SusAN B. ANTHONY
Despite post-trial public outrage against Judge Hunt,
the record suggests that his heavy-handed demeanor
persisted at Anthony's historic sentencing. Anthony's
sentence would cement forever the outcome of women's first
highly-publicized test of the Fourteenth Amendment's
enfranchisement power, and would affect both the public's
opinion of Anthony, and her chances for an appeal.
Although the judge's sentence would prove a deft stroke
of judicial maneuvering, his allocution allowed Anthony to
highlight his grievous legal errors during the trial. Before
delivering his sentence, Hunt inquired: "Has the prisoner
anything to say why sentence shall not be pronounced?"
188
The prisoner had much to say, and in answer to this
ceremonious invitation, Susan B. Anthony, for the first time
during the proceedings, addressed the Court on her own
behalf:
Yes, your honor, I have many things to say; for in your ordered
verdict of guilty, you have trampled under foot every vital
principle of our government. My natural rights, my civil rights, my
political rights, my judicial rights, are all alike ignored. Robbed of
the fundamental privilege of citizenship, I am degraded from the
status of a citizen to that of a subject; and not only myself
individually, but all of my sex, by your honor's verdict, doomed to
political subjection under this, so-called, form of government.18 9
Judge Hunt attempted to hush Anthony five separate
times, but she would not be silent:
Anthony: But your honor will not deny me this one and only poor
186. See id. at 69-70.
187. Id. at 81.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 82. Anthony's grasp of the significance of her trial was keen; she
had made herself the test case for all American women on the issue of suffrage,
and with her, all women had lost.
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privilege of protest against this high-handed outrage upon my
citizen's rights. May it please the Court to remember that since
the day of my arrest last November, this is the first time that
either myself or any person of my disenfranchised class has been
allowed a word of defense before judge or jury .... 190
Hunt: The Court must insist-the prisoner has been tried
according to the established forms of law.'
9
'
Anthony: Yes, your honor, but by forms of law all made by men,
interpreted by men, administered by men, in favor of men, and
against women .... But, yesterday, the same man made forms of
law, declared it a crime... for you, or me, or you of us, to give a
cup of cold water, or bread, or a night's shelter to a [fugitive slave].
And every man or woman in whose veins coursed a drop of human
sympathy violated that wicked law, reckless of consequences, and
was justified in so doing. As then, the slaves who got their freedom
must take it over, or under, or through the unjust forms of law,
precisely so, now, must women, to get their right to a voice in this
government, take it; and I have taken mine, and mean to take it at.. 192
every possible opportunity.
Anthony went on to identify another deficiency in her
trial; not only was she denied justice by a "broad and liberal
interpretation of the Constitution," and a trial by jury, but
the jury was "a jury not of [her] peers."'93 This was another
190. Id.
191. Id. at 83.
192. Id. at 83-84. Anthony's explicit threat to civilly disobey an unjust law,
as she had in her more active abolitionist days, anticipated an effective tactic of
the latter generations of suffragists. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 666
(describing how twentieth-century suffragists were repeatedly jailed for
picketing the White House); Richter, supra note 30, at 28 (explaining that "word
of the[] horrifying treatment [of suffragists in jail] reached the public, it was the
impetus needed to raise the public's conscience and outrage, turning the tide in
favor of the 19th Amendment of the Constitution.") In fact, latter-day
suffragists are credited with providing America with a model of protest which
other groups could utilize "to protest their political and social exclusion in the
years to come." SARA HUNTER GRAHAM, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE NEW
DEMOCRACY 147 (1996). Despite her threat, Anthony wouldn't have the chance
to disobey the voting restriction again: On November 4th, 1873, Anthony left
the bedside of her dying sister Guelma to revisit the polling place and offer her
vote, and discovered that her name had been struck from the register. See
HARPER, supra note 21, at 447. She never again attempted to cast her vote in a
national election. See id.
193. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 84. The Women's
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aspect of her arguments that had arrived ahead of its time,
as the Supreme Court would not begin to recognize the
right to a jury of one's peers as a literal command until
1880, when it held that a black man's trial before an all-
white jury did not constitute trial by his peers, and was
therefore an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.'
Wishing to dramatize her example as much as possible,
Anthony demanded that she receive "not leniency," but
"rather the full rigors of the law."19 Judge Hunt finally
succeeded in his repeated requests for Anthony to sit down
and be quiet, only to find, to his embarrassment, that he
had to ask her to stand up again to be sentenced.'96 The
sentence was succinct and legally brilliant: Hunt imposed a
fine of one hundred dollars, considered very high for the
offense," and the costs of prosecution, (for a total of
$204.41),"9s but specified that Anthony would not be
committed to jail awaiting payment of the fine. 99
Hunt's primary intention was not that Anthony atone
for her crime by paying the fine, something she swore she
Declaration of Independence, authored at the Seneca Falls Convention,
condemned the fact that;
the women of this nation have never been allowed a jury of their
peers-being tried in all cases by men, native and foreign, educated
and ignorant, virtuous and vicious. Young girls have been arraigned in
our courts... tried, convicted, hanged-victims, perchance, of judge,
jurors, advocates-while no woman's voice could be heard in their
defense.
Marina Angel, Susan Glaspell's Trifles and a Jury of Her Peers: Woman Abuse
in a Literary and Legal Context, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 779 (1997).
194. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Brown, supra note
43, at 2183-84 (noting that the Strauder court based its reasoning on the
premise that exclusion of citizens from a jury was "a brand upon them... an
assertion of their inferiority," but was careful to note in dicta that a state "may
confine [jury selection] to males"); see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881) (holding that equal protection precludes race-based jury selection,
regardless of whether the exclusion derives from official action or state law).
195. United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 84.
196. See id.
197. See KLEES, supra note 72, at 18.
198. See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 85
(1987).
199. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 85. Criminal
procedure did not require Hunt to order Anthony's imprisonment, pending
payment of the fine: "In all criminal or penal cases in which judgment or
sentence has been or shall be rendered, imposing the payment of a fine or
penalty[, the judgment may or may not direct imprisonment, as provided by 17
U.S. Stat. 198]." DESTY, supra note 108, at 224.
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would never do,2. but to bring a permanent end to the case.
Because Anthony would not be imprisoned, she couldn't
move for a writ of habeas corpus and enable the case to be
appealed further.2"' The skill in this irregular move is most
often attributed to Conkling's pull on Hunt's figurative
strings, rather than the legal expertise of the inexperienced,
provincial judge.2 2 Whatever the source of his inspiration,
Hunt surely recognized the need to stop the case in its
tracks. Lawyers at the time speculated that, had Anthony
taken her case to the Supreme Court by a writ of habeas
corpus, Hunt's denial of trial by jury would have made her
discharge certain.20 3  204
Thus ended United States v. Anthony. Women's
attempt to gain suffrage through the Fourteenth
Amendment was short-lived and unsuccessful; it would
begin with the District of Columbia cases, climax with
Anthony, and end with the Minor case just a few months
later.20  Although the conviction that the Fourteenth
200. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 84-85.
Anthony reacted to her sentence thus: "I shall never pay a dollar of your unjust
penalty[;] ... not a penny shall go to this unjust claim. And I shall earnestly
and persistently continue to urge all women to the practical recognition of the
old revolutionary maxim, that 'Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God.' " Id.
at 84-85.
There is some speculation that Selden's chivalrous nature may have prompted
him to secretly pay Anthony's fine. "Before he died in the early 1980's, George
Selden, Jr., a descendent of Henry Selden, confided to J. Sheldon Fisher, an
early director of the Rochester Historical Society, that Henry Selden had in fact
paid the fine." BARRY, supra note 6, at 267. In any event, Anthony remained
true to her word, and paid only the court costs of the trial. Her fine would
remain (to the public) outstanding throughout her lifetime, and the government
would never attempt to exact the hundred dollars from her. See KATHERiNE
ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 300.
201. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 84, at 104.
202. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 299.
203. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 84, at 104.
204. Although court remedies were closed to Anthony, see supra note 110
(describing the limiting of options after Selden paid Anthony's bail), Anthony
was encouraged to appeal for remission of her fine to President Grant, for whom
she had cast her fated vote, but she refused. See CAT' & SHULER, supra note 84,
at 105. Instead, she addressed an appeal to Congress in her own name.
Although the appeal was dismissed because Congress had no authority to act,
Judge Hunt's handling of the case prompted Senator Matt H. Carpenter of
Wisconsin to call for "an amended system of jurisprudence, since 'a citizen may
be tried, condemned and put to death by the erroneous judgment of a single
judge, and no court can grant him relief or a new trial.' "Id. at 105-06.
205. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 106. For a general discussion of
cases asserting woman votership under the common law prior to Anthony's, see
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Amendment did enfranchise women remained with suffrage
leaders and lawyers alike, the idea would not be tested
again in Court."6 Anthony and others, embittered by the
experience, knew that the "potent alembic" of politics would
not be employed on their behalf, and thus refused to waste
any further efforts to secure a favorable judicial decision."7
Nevertheless, United States v. Anthony remained an
important part of the American consciousness. Co-counsel
Van Voorhis would later state as his considered opinion of
the case: "There never before was a trial in the country of
one-half the importance as this of Miss Anthony's.... If
Miss Anthony had won her case on the merits, it would
have revolutionized the suffrage of the country and
enfranchised every woman in the United States."0 8 Indeed,
had Anthony's characterization of citizenship prevailed, her
case would have enfranchised every competent citizen of the
United States.
Moreover, the case rocketed Anthony to a position of
widespread public recognition, and won new respect both
for herself and her cause. Following the trial, letters of
sympathy and financial donations amounting to over a
thousand dollars, came flooding to Anthony.0 9 The following
year, a newspaper hailed her as "America's Best-Known
Woman." 0 In the years following the trial, Anthony's
agents would capitalize on her status as a well-known
"battle axe, blunt but convincing," saluting her with the
nickname "The Invincible."
211
"THE VERDICT OF HISTORY" : ANTHONY'S LEGACY
Years after the trial, Susan's co-counsel Van Voorhis
Stanton & Anthony, supra note 122, at 586-755.
206. See CATr & SHULER, supra note 84, at 106.
207. Id. After her trial, Anthony vowed, "I shall never again beg my rights,
but will come to Congress each year and demand recognition of them." She
never missed that appointment. See BURNETT, supra note 19, at 239.
208. See KATHERINE ANTHONY, supra note 82, at 299.
209. See id. at 300.
210. Coolidge, supra note 2, at 63; see O'Connor, supra note 12, at 662.
211. Coolidge, supra note 2, at 64. By her fiftieth birthday celebration on
February 15, 1870, Anthony's many nicknames ranged from the reverent to the
humorous. She was variously compared to Napoleon, Bismarck, Christ's
apostles, Elizabeth the First, and the biblical judge, Deborah. She was called
"St. Anthony," "more revered than General Washington," and a "vestal virgin."
BARRY, supra note 6, at 219.
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said of her trial: "I predict that the verdict of history will be
that Judge Selden was right and the Court wrong upon the
constitutional questions involved in this case."
12
History would indeed recognize Anthony's position on
August 26, 1920, with the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment, fourteen years after her death.13 Anthony had
drafted the Amendment herself in 1875.14 Patterned after
the Fourteenth Amendment, it reads, simply, "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex. "2 The enactment came to be referred to, tellingly, as
"the Anthony Amendment."
2 16
With the passage of the Amendment, it would have
been easy to conclude that Anthony's trial, and what it
represented, were rendered obsolete. With the
constitutional questions finally answered, the journey was
complete. However, such a conclusion rests upon the
premise that the enfranchisement of women signaled the
completion of their social, political, and legal emancipation.
In fact, it was just the beginning. Anthony's trial had asked
much more than a series of Constitutional questions; it had
raised important queries about the institution of true
democracy, the place of women in society, their power to
reform through the avenues of politics, and fitness to
assume leadership roles within that context.
United States v. Anthony is a mere footnote in most law
school texts, but the arguments that Anthony advanced
provide a comprehensive framework by which to measure
the success of her mission as it continues today. Anthony's
arguments for woman suffrage are ultimately compelling
pleas for woman's right to be viewed as a non-identical, yet
equal partner with man.
212. See HARPER, supra note 21, at 445.
213. See Richter, supra note 30, at 26; O'Connor, supra note 12, at 668. The
Amendment was merely the federal institution of enfranchisement; beginning
in 1869 when Wyoming's bill for women's suffrage was being signed into law,
many other states would enfranchise their citizens. See ScoTT & Scorr, supra
note 83, chart at 167. Wyoming was admitted to the Union as a suffrage state in
1890. Colorado, Idaho, Utah, Washington, California, Arizona and Illinois
(presidential suffrage only) would follow suit between 1893 and 1914. See
COOLIDGE, supra note 2, at 181; O'Connor, supra note 12, at 663 (describing
Arizona's enfranchisement of women through initiative and referendum.)
214. See ADAMS, supra note 45, at 165.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
216. ADAMS, supra note 45, at 148, 159.
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Anthony did not, however, anticipate that this change
could take place with the swiftness her impatient heart
might desire. With typical foresight, Anthony grasped the
historical pattern of nation-wide response to Constitutional
change, and predicted that:
[iun woman's transition from the position of subject to sovereign,
there must needs be an era of self-sustained self-supported homes,
where her freedom and equality shall be unquestioned .... The
habit of the ages cannot, at once, be changed. Not even amended
constitutions and laws can revolutionize the practical relations of
men and women, immediately, any more than did the
Constitutional freedom and franchise of Black men, transform
white men into practical recognition of the civil and political rights
of those who were but yesterday their legal slaves. Constitutional
equality only gives to all the aid and protection of the law, while
they educate and develop themselves, while they grow into the full
stature of freemen. It simply allows equality of chances to establish
equality.1 7
America has had eighty years since the passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment to educate herself, and to make use
of her chance to establish equality, and at the initiation of a
fresh millennium, the progress of the nation in achieving
the equality that Anthony envisioned in her trial deserves
to be explored.
I: Completion of Democracy
Anthony believed that "[olur democratic-republican
government is based on the idea of the natural right of
every individual member thereof to a voice and a vote in
making and executing the laws."218 She quoted liberally
from government documents and transcripts to establish a
solid connection between natural rights, the stated aims of
the Declaration of Independence, and the Federal and New
York State Constitutions.219 Hence, not only did natural
rights call for universal enfranchisement, but the
Constitution, through its purported embrace of natural
rights, demanded it as well:
217. See Susan B. Anthony, speech, Homes of Single Women, October, 1877,
reprinted in READER, supra note 1, at 147-48.
218. See United States v. Anthony transcript, supra note 20, at 151.
219. See id. at 153-56.
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It was we, the people, not we, the white male citizens, nor yet we,
the male citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed this
Union. And we formed it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to
secure them; not to the half of ourselves and the half of our
posterity, but to the whole people-women as well as men. And it
is downright mockery to talk to women of their enjoyment of the
blessings of liberty while they are denied the use of the only means
of securing them provided by this democratic-republican
government-the ballot.
220
Without the vote secured for women, Anthony stated,
"this government is not a democracy. It is not a republic. It
is an odious aristocracy; a hateful oligarchy of sex." 21
The question for today's women must then be whether
women's suffrage has completed America's stated goal of
democracy, and obtained a meaningful voice for women to
secure the "blessings of liberty" for themselves and their
daughters.
The answer is beginning to dawn in the affirmative, but
it has taken decades to appear. Although women did begin
to vote, attend conventions, and find representation in
national party committees and campaign offices shortly
after the Nineteenth Amendment's passage, they remained
"second class citizens despite their new designation as
voters" until the mid-twentieth century.122  Latter-day
suffragists attributed female voter apathy to a lack of
appreciation by women for what the vote had cost
themselves and others. Woman's Party member Alice Paul
reflected years later that "the Amendment was like a
loosing of chains.., once they were removed and the
chafing healed, the victim ceased to remember how she had
felt when she was still bound." 3
To today's women, voting may often appear more of a
challenge than a privilege. 2 To the twentieth-century
mind, for which the echoes of the suffrage movement have
faded nearly to oblivion, voting is often an unwelcome
demand on time and energy, rather than a jealously-
guarded right of citizenship. But whether viewed as a
220. Id. at 153.
221. Id. at 159.
222. GRAHAM, supra note 192, at 154.
223. ADAMS, supra note 45, at 169.
224. See COOLIDGE, supra note 2, at 180.
225. See id.
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compelling civic duty, or a celebrated privilege of
democratic citizenship, the woman vote deserves to be
recognized for what it is: a pearl of great price, won at the
close of a war for equality which, however bloodless,
absorbed and claimed the lives of women like Anthony, who
sacrificed their strength, their talents, and their years, to
advance "the Cause."
II: Protection of Women's Interests
Anthony's expectations for woman suffrage were
pragmatic as well as philosophical: she viewed woman
suffrage as the surest way for women to protect their
personal and financial well-being, and that of their
children.
Despite political, social and economic progress, women
continue to be vulnerable even in their homes. For example,
courts have yet to fully awaken to the illegality and
inhumanity of spousal abuse.226 In 1994, Congress passed
the Violence Against Women Act to call attention to, and
funnel resources to combat, the problem of domestic
violence."' But despite such legislation, seventy-five percent
of American women can expect to fall victim to a violent
crime at some time in their lives.228 Marriage remains "a
dangerous institution for women," as well: into the 1990's,
almost twenty percent of female homicide victims were
murdered by their husbands or ex-husbands.229 In many
states, marital rape or assault is punished less stringently
than similar crimes."'
In 1986, the Supreme Court, newly joined by its first
woman Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor, held that sexual
harassment was an actionable claim under Title VII's
226. See Ammons, supra note 14, at 1264-65.
227. See id. at 1265. The Act's potential is still being explored; in a recent
decision, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional that portion of the law
which created a federal civil rights remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence. See United States v. Morrison, - U.S.-, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
228. Lawsky, supra note 33, at 783.
229. Id. at 810. See generally Angel, supra note 193, at 808-10 (describing
homicide statistics for spousal killings).
230. Lawsky, supra note 33, at 814. Marital rape was not even classified as
a crime in all fifty states until 1993. See Laura X. et. al., Accomplishing the
Impossible: An Advocate's Notes from the Successful Campaign to Make Marital
and Date Rape a Crime in All 50 U.S. States and Other Countries, 5 VIOLENCE
AGAiNSTWOMEN 1064, 1078 app. (1999).
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prohibition of sex discrimination.Y' In 1994, joined by a
second woman Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court
found gender-based peremptory challenges to jurists
unconstitutional.2"2
Although such strides are encouraging, the self-
interests of women have yet to be satisfied through
legislation-not only because the growing number of male
legislators and judges sensitive to their concerns remains a
minority, but because women themselves have been slow to
legislate and to judge. It appears that, while opportunity is
abundant and obstacles are shrinking, women are just
beginning to approach equal representation in the
legislative and judicial bodies that govern their lives as a
serious goal.
III: Improving the Process through Votership and
Participation
Even after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,
women were slow to take their hard-won place at the
polls, 3 and Anthony's dream of a bona fide women's
political party has yet to materialize."4 In 1924, less than
one-third of eligible women cast a vote; not until 1952 did
women vote in equal numbers with men-but they did so
231. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 673; Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's
appointment was, itself, a remarkable illustration of the expanding
opportunities for women in the legal setting. When O'Connor graduated from
Stanford Law School, at the top of her class, her most prestigious job offer was
that of a legal secretary. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 673; Berry, supra note
5, at 208-09. Fellow Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg attended Harvard Law
School, and later transferred to Columbia Law School, where she graduated tied
for first in her class. See id. at 216-17. Despite such accomplishments,
Ginsburg, too, struggled to attain desirable employment at big firms. As her
Harvard dean had suggested to his female law students, she was considered a
usurper, "occupying seats that could be taken by men." See id. at 217. The
presence of women on the highest bench has not won for the Court instant
applause for its sympathy regarding certain women's issues. The actionability
of sexual harassment claims and related employment protections, like many
other advances in women's rights, have been attacked as counterproductive. See
Ammons, supra note 14, at 1268.
232. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (O'Connor
& Ginsburg, J.J., concurring); O'Connor, supra note 12, at 673.
233. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 669.
234. See Lawsky, supra note 33, at 815.
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with a decidedly independent voice.2"5 In that election, the
women's vote diverged from that of their husbands and
fathers, "giving the lie, for at least a substantial number of
women, to the prewar stereotype of women following their
husbands or fathers, sheep-like, into the polling booth.""6
Since 1984, the numerical difference between total male
and female votership has been negligible, 7 while women
have comprised a distinct and independent votership,
giving rise to "a sizable political-party gender gap in
American politics." 8
Those "women who are politically active in conventional
ways" are the truest heirs of the suffrage movement,2 9 but
women have established their voice in a variety of ways
beyond voting. It is their participation as jurors, attorneys,
judges, politicians, lobbyists, and informed citizens which
imbues their vote with its fullest meaning, and which
expresses the concerns of women, and therefore, of a
greater percentage of the country, most fully.
After Wyoming territory women were enfranchised in
1869, opportunities to assume other roles followed closely.
In an unprecedented act, a woman was appointed a Justice
of the Peace, an important officership which allowed her to
hear and decide nearly forty cases so deftly that none were
ever appealed to a higher Court.240 Others welcomed the
opportunity to perform jury service,24' one such jury
235. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 669.
236. Id.; see also Mrs. W. Winston Crannell, Do Not Want the Ballot,
reprinted in PAMPHLETS PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED BY THE WOMEN'S ANTI-
SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION, supra note 10, at 2 (reporting the comments of "scores
of country women" in 1896 that "each woman would vote as her father or
husband voted").
237. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 669.
238. Id. Recent polls indicate that while the majority of men support
Republicans, women lean toward the Democratic party. See id. at 669-70.
239. Coolidge, supra note 2, at 180.
240. See CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 79-80.
241. Although contemporary views of jury service would tend to focus on
"the obligation to spend long hours in shabby court facilities, waiting for
something to happen," in reality, the extension of jury service to women was
significant in that it granted to them one of the highest privileges of citizenship.
Brown, supra note 43, at 2182-83.
The institution of the jury expresses a mutual faith among citizens who
assign to each other a function otherwise reserved to professional
judges and lawmakers: the power to determine wrongs, to remedy
them, and to decide each others' fates. The expression "a jury of one's
peers" imbues jury service with a dignitary value.
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acquiring a reputation as "such a terror to evil-doers that a
stampede began among them, and very many left the state
forever."" Although the Wyoming Legislature passed a bill
two years later to attempt to repeal the suffrage act, it was
vetoed by the governor, who noted that "to repeal it...
would advertise to the world that women in their use of
enfranchisement had not justified the acts of the members
of the previous session and.., such an imputation would be
false and untenable., 4 ' Although the bill narrowly escaped
passage by a two-thirds vote in the House and Council, no
further efforts were made to repeal woman suffrage in
Wyoming.244 As other states would slowly discover, woman
suffrage (and by it, women's participation in juries and
public occupations) was "an unimpeachable success."24
Women gradually passed from sitting on juries to
addressing them as attorneys. 46 The Bradwell Court had
once expressed the concern that, should women become
lawyers, the "hot strifes of the bar,' and the requisite
'momentous verdicts, the prizes of struggle [would] tend to
destroy the deference and delicacy with which it is a matter
of pride of our ruder sex to treat [women] .... ,,247
Statistically, it appears that many American women
Id. at 2183. See generally Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women's Jury Service:
Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1994)
(discussing the significance of establishing a woman's citizenship-based right to
serve on juries).
242. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 662-63 (citation omitted). The opportunity
for women to serve as jurists was afforded by the efforts of anti-suffragists,
"intending thereby to make the whole cause of women in politics so obnoxious to
the public that it would prepare the way for a repeal of the woman suffrage
measure .... " CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 80. The strategy backfired, as
"the woman jurors were continually complimented and praised by judges and
press." See id. News of the women jurors prompted King William of Prussia to
cable President Grant in a congratulatory message "upon this evidence of
progress, enlightenment, and civil liberty in America." Id. at 81 (citation
omitted). It should be noted that not all courts in all states drew this connection
between votership and jury service, and thus, some took an "incremental"
rather than "emancipatory" view of the voter-jurist relationship. See Brown,
supra note 43, at 2194-2201.
243. CATT & SHULER, supra note 84, at 82.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 84.
246. For a general discussion of "jury experiments" and the evolution of
women in law, see Cristina M. Rodriguez, Clearing the Smoke-Filled Room:
Women Jurors and the Disruption of an Old-Boys' Network in Nineteenth-
Century America, 108 YALE L.J. 1805, 1808 (1999).
247. Friedman, supra note 117, at 1291-92.
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would prefer to advance through the "hot strifes of the bar"
than men's coats thrown over mud puddles. Today, women
account for thirty percent of the legal profession, and over
forty percent of law school graduates. 8 The most recent
cabinet includes the first woman Attorney General.
Surely women have proved themselves worthy contenders
for the "prizes of struggle," but this bare fact has not
penetrated the reality completely. A 1996 American Bar
Association report revealed that "female attorneys still
encounter gender-based harassment, earn less money, and
receive fewer promotions than their male colleagues."250
Inspired by those who have gone before, today's woman
attorneys must complete their mission in shaping the law-
and the perceptions and practices of the legal community-
for equality.
Recent years have also seen an unprecedented number
of women appointed to judgeships on the federal level,
including the United States Supreme Court.251 Many
commentators have argued that women, as judges, exercise
a more holistic view of cases, and therefore are able to craft
decisions that are more context-specific, and less governed
by arbitrary rules. 2 According to one scholar, "modern men
and women, in general, have distinctly different
perspectives on the world... [While women emphasize
connection, subjectivity, and responsibility, men emphasize
autonomy, objectivity, and rights."2 53
Others, however, find this assumption unfounded, and,
at the very least, problematic. 254 Recent studies in the social
248. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 673.
249. See Donna Shalala, Our Collective Challenges, in A VOICE OF OUR OWN
187, 188 (Nancy M. Neuman ed., 1996).
250. Berry, supra note 5, at xii.
251. See Mfichael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist
Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 891 (1995). In the first year of his administration,
President Clinton nominated eleven women and seventeen men to federal
judgeships. The percentage of women (40%) is the highest proportion appointed
by any preceding administration. See Henry J. Reske, A Report Card on
Clinton's Judges, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 16; see also Shalala, supra note 249, at
188 (noting that, because of Clinton appointees, more women are presently
serving as judges than ever before).
252. See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 251, at 891.
253. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 543, 582 (1986), quoted in Solimine &
Wheatley, supra note 251, at 895.
254. See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 251, at 893.
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sciences have found "little empirical support" for the idea
that women adjudicate cases in a uniquely feminine way.25
The only documented difference in "feminine" decisions is
that women were slightly more liberal in their decisions
regarding all forms of discrimination.2 ' However, as the
authors concluded, if women do grant greater latitude to
victims of discrimination or abuse, it may be because they
themselves are more likely to have confronted similar
issues in their lives, and not because they enjoy a unique
form of judicial analysis.257
Overall, today's women judges, both in their decisions
and in their writings about the "art of judging," exercise
and describe their roles in the traditional framework shared
by their male peers.258 They are, appropriately, assuming
the role of "neutral, impartial decision-maker.",
2
Not long after her Supreme Court appointment, Justice
Ginsburg "remarked that she was in favor of a 'diverse
judiciary,' but was against 'anything like proportional
representation.' ,260 She added that she "looked forward to
the day when it would be regarded as 'natural' for women to
act as judges."26' Certainly the women of the judiciary today,
small but growing, have proved that their voice, distinct or
not, is well-suited to the bench.
Women were also hesitant to enter the world of politics,
perhaps largely because of the insult of a century of
repression. With regard to the period following the passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment, Carrie Chapman Catt
mused:
Many men expressed disappointment that women did not at once
enter the party campaigns with the same zeal and consecration
255. Elaine Martin, Women on the Bench: A Different Voice, 77 JUDICATURE
126, 128 (1993), quoted in Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 251, at 897-98.
256. See generally Sue Davis et. al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S.
Court of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129 (1993) (analyzing the effect gender has on
judging); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal
Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425 (1994)
(discussing an analysis of judicial decision-making based on the gender of the
judges); Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 251, at 898-900 (describing results of
studies of gender differences in judging).
257. See Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 251, at 898-99.
258. Id. at 905.
259. Id. at 906.
260. Id. at 919 (citation omitted).
261. Id. at 919-20 (citation omitted).
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they had shown in the struggle for the vote. These men forget that
the dominant political parties blocked the normal pro&ess of
woman suffrage for half a century. The women remember.
Women's participation in politics, albeit slow, has
begun to proliferate. By the mid-1990s, eight women
occupied Senate seats, and forty-seven women were
members of the House of Representatives.2" Seven held
cabinet-level positions under President Clinton.2 ' Although
disproportionate, the number of women occupying political
positions at every level is increasing.
IV: Shedding Political Subjection
Anthony and her peers intended the Nineteenth
Amendment to end "the prolonged slavery of woman," and
foresaw the nullification of voting restrictions as the
quintessential statement of women's legal and political
equality.
265
As African-Americans would discover in the civil rights
movement, which has continued decades beyond their
enfranchisement, the badges of subjection and slavery exist
long beyond their official removal; society requires
generations of education and reformation before a once-
subjected people can be made whole.266
The last generation of suffragists understood that the
suffrage battle was but one in a greater war; the war for
true, recognized political and social equality with men. In
1919, suffrage leader Anna Howard Shaw expressed her
"[pity] for you young women who have to carry on the work
for the next ten years, for suffrage was a symbol, and now
you have lost your symbol."
267
Despite advances, women remain subject to their male
counterparts in employment and wage-earning potential. In
1996, American women were 1.3 times as likely to be living
in poverty as men.2  Although women are employed in
262. Adams, supra note 45, at 163.
263. Shalala, supra note 249, at 188.
264. Id.
265. Brown, supra note 43, at 2181-82 (citations omitted).
266. See id. at 2204.
267. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 670.
268. See id. at 672.
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virtually every existing occupation,69 they earn, on average,
only 82% of what their male counterparts do.
Furthermore, women remain unable to contract for
compensation for work accomplished within the home.2
As some commentators have argued, a fresh
interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment; one which
recognizes that the Amendment was a statement of
women's constitutional equality, and not simply an
extension of the franchise, may provide a basis for women
to redefine themselves within the American social and legal
realms.1 2 However, up to the present day, the Anthony
Amendment has been granted "only a paltry existence,"
interpreted, not as a signal of equality, but as a simple
extension of votership.273
CONCLUSION
Notable suffragist Frances Harper proclaimed in 1893:
"Today we stand on the threshold of the women's era. In her
hand are possibilities whose use or abuse must tell upon
the political life of the nation, and send their influence for
269. See Adams, supra note 45, at 233. Despite such statistics, job
discrimination against women persists, and the proof necessary to prove gender
discrimination requires an ironic and illogical balance of asserting gender
differences while arguing for equal treatment. See generally CATHERINE
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987)
(comparing difference and dominance approaches); Margaret Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (describing the "double bind"
involved in arguing that women's special needs be considered in formulating
equal outcomes); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:
Finding Our Place; Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989)
(describing the particular, compounded dilemmas faced by women of color in
employment discrimination suits).
270. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 672.
271. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives'Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127 (1994).
272. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923), overruled on
other grounds by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding
that "[iun view of the.., changes which have taken place.., in the contractual,
political, and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment,
it is not unreasonable to say that these differences [between the sexes] have
now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point"); Lawsky, supra note 33,
at 786 (asserting that the Nineteenth Amendment involves "more than voting
alone; [it] also forbids a state from interfering with women's political citizenship
and full political participation"). See generally Brown, supra note 43, at 2175.
273. See Brown, supra note 43, at 2204.
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good or evil across the track of unborn ages."274
Her words are especially vital today, where the theory
that the sexes are fundamentally and unalterably
dissimilar is still being tried in a prodigiously diverse
crucible, and in a nation where women's energetic devotion
to their careers, homes, faiths, and families, as well as
grateful political participation, are together considered a
reasonable expectation for their lives.
The women of today have inherited a place on a
remarkable journey toward the true social, financial, and
political equality sought by Susan B. Anthony and her
peers, yet there is much ground still to be covered. Anthony
believed that in a fight for equality which had been
consecrated by the lives of dedicated women, "failure is
impossible!"275 Thus, pioneer Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor has reflected, "No doubt the redoubtable
women of the suffrage movement would tell us not to rest
until full equality is achieved."276 Women may discover that
the truest progress can be made addressing their own trials
in the tradition of United States v. Anthony. As Anthony
did, women must continue to fearlessly test the artificial
boundaries surrounding them, and to prove, by sacrifice,
repetition, and demonstrated excellence, their fitness to
occupy whatever role to which they may aspire.
A weary Susan B. Anthony once noted, "everyday
brings to me new conceptions of life and its duties, and it is
my constant desire that I may be strong and fearless,
baring my arm to the encounter and pressing cheerfully
forward, though the way is rough and thorny." " The same
challenge holds true for her heiresses today: the Cause
endures, bursting with promise, and though the way
continues to be "rough and thorny," for "new, true women"
of courage, failure is indeed impossible.
274. Evans, supra note 4, at 145.
275. See HARPER, supra note 18, at 34.
276. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 675.
277. HARPER, supra note 21, at 158.
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